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Abstract
The effect of uncertainty on firms’ behavior and on the macroeconomy is generally
negative in the literature. Extensive research has also demonstrated that financial
frictions limit the extent of firms’ activities and growth prospects. In the first two
chapters of this dissertation, I study both empirically and theoretically how a spe-
cific type of uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty, interacts with financial frictions
to affect the behavior of exporting firms. In line with the existing literature, I find
in the first chapter that exports of manufacturing sectors in which firms are more
financially constrained decrease by more in times of high uncertainty. Having more
tangible capital, which can potentially be used as collateral, makes the effect of un-
certainty less negative, especially im sectors where firms are large. Relying more on
external financing, on the other hand, makes the effect more negative and affects
sectors with small firms more.
Current theoretical models have little to say about the effect of uncertainty on
heterogeneous firms. To address this issue, I introduce in the second chapter a model
of financially-constrained heterogeneous exporting firms in which credit conditions
depend on the degree of exchange rate uncertainty. Firms in different sectors face
different types of financial constraints, and are therefore differently affected by un-
certainty. I use the calibrated model to evaluate potential policies that could be
implemented to alleviate the negative effect of exchange rate uncertainty on exports.
The uncovered interest parity puzzle is the empirical finding that countries with
higher risk-free interest rates tend to see their currencies appreciate in the short run.
Typical two-country macroeconomic models instead predict that high interest-rate
currencies depreciate, with arbitrage opportunities eliminating profitable carry trade
strategies. The international finance literature responded to this puzzle by providing
several alternative theoretical models able to explain the puzzle. In the third chapter
of this dissertation, I study how the predictions of two of these alternative models -
the habit model of Verdelhan (2010) and the distorted belief model of Gourinchas and
Tornell (2004) - are affected when re-cast in a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium framework. I investigate how the mechanisms rely on specific parameter
values in order to find under which conditions, if any, they can explain the UIP puzzle.
In addition, I obtain business cycle moments from model simulations and compare
them to the moments obtained from a standard two-country DSGE model and from
the data.
My results show that for the first model, the habit model, the UIP results disap-
pear under realistic calibrations. For the second model, the distorted beliefs model,
UIP properties remain under some calibrations. In addition, business cycle predic-
tions remain close to empirical evidence.
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1 The effect of exchange rate uncertainty on inter-
national trade: The role of financial frictions - An
empirical analysis
1.1 Introduction
The effect of uncertainty on firms’ behavior and on the macroeconomy is generally
negative in the literature. Extensive research has also demonstrated that financial
frictions limit the extent of firms’ activities and growth prospects. In this chapter,
I study empirically how a specific type of uncertainty, exchange rate uncertainty, in-
teracts with financial frictions to affect the behavior of exporting firms. In line with
the existing literature, I find that exports of manufacturing sectors in which firms are
more financially constrained decrease by more in times of high uncertainty.
The unpredictability of exchange rates dates from the collapse of the Bretton
Woods agreement in 1973, when the currencies of advanced countries began to float
against each other. Initial theories about the effect on international trade, including
Ethier (1973) and Clark (1973), suggested that in the absence of effective financial
hedging tools, an increase in exchange rate volatility and unpredictability would nega-
tively affect risk-averse firms. Volatility was expected to result, other things equal, in
a decrease in international trade. The question remains of interest today, as countries
still consider joining or leaving currency unions, and central banks in several countries
consider whether to target the exchange rate or the volatility of the exchange rate as
part of their monetary policy.
The extensive empirical literature on the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on
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international trade has not yet reached definitive conclusions. Recent surveys con-
clude that the aggregate effects are generally not significant and that, when they are,
they are small in magnitude.1 The recent literature has found more significant results
using disaggregated data: some industries are more negatively affected than others.
This suggests more serious effects at the disaggregated level.
This chapter estimates the role that financial frictions play in the relationship
between exchange rate uncertainty and trade in the context of financially developed
countries. Canadian exports to the United States in 21 manufacturing industries are
studied over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period. Figure 1.1 plots the exchange rate and ex-
change rate uncertainty - measured as the average squared (log) change in the nominal
exchange rate over the previous six months - during this period. Both series fluctuate
widely. The exchange rate reaches lows under parity and highs above 1.5 CAD per
USD. Such variations can seriously affect the profitability of firms operating in both
countries.
Two measures of financial constraints are commonly used in the literature: as-
set tangibility and external finance dependence. On the one hand, firms with more
tangible assets are typically seen as less constrained since they are able to offer more
collateral to potential lenders. On the other hand, firms with higher external finance
dependence are typically seen as more financially constrained since they are thought
to be closer to their borrowing limit. Since Beck et al. (2008) find that smaller
firms are significantly more financially constrained even when controlling for other
observables, I also examine the effect of firm size as an indirect measure of financial
constraints. In the main regressions, I interact the two direct measures of financial
constraints with the sectoral share of exports that comes from small or medium firms.
1See, for example, McKenzie (1999) and Auboin & Ruta (2013).
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To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the heterogeneous effects of
financial constraints in this context.
I find that exchange rate uncertainty has on average a negative effect on Cana-
dian exports to the U.S. and that this effect varies significantly across industries. As
expected, sectors in which firms have more tangible assets see their exports decrease
less in times of high uncertainty. This result is even stronger for sectors composed
of relatively large firms. In sectors in which a higher share of exports comes from
small or medium firms, external finance dependence acts as a financial constraint and
makes the effect of uncertainty on exports more negative.
A feature of my analysis is the focus on Canada-U.S. trade and a time period
in which 1) exchange rate volatility is high, 2) exchange rate volatility fluctuates
significantly, and 3) hedging instruments are widely available, while simultaneously
not targeting exclusively the recent financial and euro crises. The fact that Canadian
exports to the United States are substantially affected by uncertainty about the CAD-
USD exchange rate is even more striking when considering the importance of the U.S.
market for Canadian exporters: during the time period studied, 80 percent of Cana-
dian exports were destined for the United States. Almost all transactions happened
in U.S. dollars. One would therefore expect Canadian firms to be fully aware of,
and insured against, exchange rate risk. This suggests that the decision to hedge ex-
change rate risk is not as straightforward as often believed, and that the effect of this
type of uncertainty on trade between different countries is potentially more negative.2
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the
existing literature; Section 1.3 describes the methodology; Section 1.4 presents the
2A recent survey performed by Export Development Canada shows that only 57 percent of the
Canadian exporting firms who participated in the survey perform some type of hedging activity.
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empirical evidence; and Section 1.5 performs robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The empirical literature on the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on international
trade is extensive. Until recently, the consensus has been that the effect of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade is typically not statistically significant and that, when it
is, the effect is fairly small and can go in either direction. A survey by McKenzie
(1999) compares the various methodologies used by different authors and concludes
that the chosen measure for exchange rate uncertainty, the model specification and
the estimation technique do not seem to impact results. A more recent survey by
Auboin & Ruta (2013) concludes that researchers that have used disaggregated data
have been more successful at finding statistically significant effects.
Klein (1990) looks at U.S. exports of nine categories of goods to seven countries
and finds that the effect of exchange rate volatility is significant for two thirds of the
categories. The direction of the effect also varies across categories. Byrne et al. (2008)
find that exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on U.S. international trade, and
that this effect is stronger for differentiated goods. More recently, Verheyen (2012)
tests whether exports from euro-zone countries to the U.S. have been affected by the
uncertainty that came with the financial crisis. He finds that sectors producing man-
ufactured goods, machinery, and transport equipment were more negatively affected.
None of these papers attempt to explain why different sectors are affected differently.
One notable exception is Chor & Manova (2012), who find that during the recent fi-
nancial crisis, U.S. imports from countries with tighter credit markets decreased more.
They also find that U.S. imports decreased more in sectors that require more exter-
nal financing, have limited access to trade credit or possess few collateralizable assets.
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In recent years, researchers have been able to use firm-level data to confirm the
importance of financial variables in determining the relationship between interna-
tional trade and uncertainty. Bricongne et al. (2012) find that during the recent euro
crisis, the French firms that reduced their exports the most were the firms operating in
sectors with high external finance dependence. Demir (2013) finds that real exchange
rate volatility negatively affects the growth of Turkish manufacturing firms, but that
this effect is reduced if firms have access to equity financing. Héricourt & Poncet
(2015) find that higher exchange rate volatility reduces the trade of Chinese firms,
and that this effect is stronger for financially vulnerable firms but weaker for firms
located in financially-developed regions of China. Other researchers have also used
firm-level data to explore mechanisms other than financial frictions. For example,
Héricourt & Nedoncelle (2018) find that French firms exporting to more destinations
are able to better manage increases in exchange rate uncertainty by redistributing
their exports across markets. This mechanism results in the firms being overall less
negatively affected.
This chapter also relates to the growing literature on the interaction between
financial frictions and international trade. Financial constraints have been found to
reduce trade independently of exchange rate uncertainty in studies such as Manova
(2008), Manova (2013), and Muûls (2015). Other studies, such as Amiti & Weinstein
(2011) and Feenstra et al. (2014), investigate more closely the role of banks in allocat-
ing credit to financially-constrained exporters. Foley & Manova (2015) offer a review
of how corporate finance has been found to affect firms’ international production and
trade decisions more generally.
Taking a wider view, this chapter contributes to the recent literature on the
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effect of economic uncertainty on the macroeconomy.3 One aim of this chapter is
to understand how specific economic agents, in this case exporting firms, react to
a specific, measurable type of uncertainty that can be readily hedged with financial
instruments.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Identification
The existing literature has raised an array of issues that can potentially bias the
estimated relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and international trade.
A first concern is omitted variable bias. Omitted variables include all factors that
affect trade between two countries, are not properly controlled for in the estimated
regressions, and are correlated with the regressor of interest, in this case exchange
rate risk. One frequently omitted variable is uncertainty about interest rates and in-
flation rates, which can both cause exchange rate uncertainty and affect international
trade directly. Another important factor is the currency in which the international
transaction takes place, which affects importers and exporters differently and which
generally varies across transactions between the same country pair. Finally, another
confounding factor in international trade more generally is the third-country effect,
which describes instances in which trade between two countries may vary over time
because of reasons pertaining to a third country.4
A second concern is endogeneity. Two countries trading a lot with one another
could see their economies becoming more correlated over time, which could stabilize
3See, among others, Aghion et al. (2009), Bloom (2014), and Alessandria et al. (2015).
4For example, if Germany increases its production of good x, which it was previously importing
from France, it may cause an increase in the export of good x from France to, say, Belgium. This
increase in trade is not due to factors specific to France or to Belgium and hence is difficult to
account for when explaining variations in bilateral trade flows.
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their exchange rate. They could also decide to fix their exchange rate, by adopting a
common currency or a pegged exchange rate. Endogeneity would cause the observed
relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade to go in the opposite direc-
tion of that studied.
For all these reasons, I focus the empirical analysis in this article on a single
country pair and study trade in a single direction: from Canada to the United States.
Political risk is low in both countries. Their economies are highly correlated, which
minimizes the possibility that differences in interest rate or inflation risk drive trade
flows. Most importantly, almost all transactions involving goods being shipped from
Canada to the U.S. are conducted in U.S. dollars and, in recent decades, 80 percent of
Canadian exports went to the U.S.5 These characteristics of the country pair greatly
reduce concerns about omitted variable bias.
Choosing this country pair however raises another potential concern: the Cana-
dian currency is highly correlated with the price of crude oil. If this fact is not
properly accounted for, it could bias the estimated relationship since variations in
exports due to oil price uncertainty could be mistakenly attributed to movements in
exchange rate uncertainty. For this reason, oil price uncertainty is included as an
additional control in the regressions.6
Choosing this country pair also addresses some of the endogeneity concerns, since
both countries had freely floating currencies over the sample period. Another poten-
tial endogeneity issue however arises from the use of this specific country pair coupled
5Donnenfeld & Haug (2008) find that 93 percent of U.S. imports from Canada are made in
U.S. dollars.
6Over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period, the CAD-USD exchange rate and the price of oil (West Texas
Intermediate, WTI) had a coefficient of correlation of -0.75. Over the same period, the volatilities
of the two series were considerably less correlated, with a coefficient of 0.35.
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with the strong relationship between the Canadian currency and the price of crude
oil. If Canadian oil exports are important enough to drive the North American price
of oil (WTI) and if the exchange rate responds to movements in the price of oil, then
Canadian exports could cause movements in the exchange rate and exchange rate
uncertainty, which would cause an endogeneity bias. It is however not a major issue
in this instance since exports of crude oil are not included in any of the regressions.7
1.3.2 Model specification
Following the literature, I obtain the empirical results in a framework of monop-
olistic competition. The amount of good ω in sector s produced in country j and
consumed in country i can be expressed as the demand function
qijs(ω) = pijs(ω)
− θsYi
P 1−is
,
where qijs(ω) denotes the quantity demanded, pijs(ω) denotes the price of the good
in country i’s currency, θs is the share of income Yi that country i spends on goods
in sector s, Pis is the price in country i of a bundle of all goods in sector s, and  is
the elasticity of substitution between different goods in a given sector. The price that
maximizes the expected profit of a risk-neutral firm is such that the firm’s expected
marginal revenue, expressed in its own currency, is equal to a constant markup over
its expected marginal cost. The marginal cost includes production costs, trade costs
and, potentially, financing costs. A risk-averse firm would instead have a markup
that increases with the degree of uncertainty.
The first empirical specification tests for the average effect of exchange rate un-
7Only manufacturing exports are included in the regressions. Furthermore, all the results below
hold if the Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing industry is excluded.
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certainty on (log) Canadian exports to the United States over time and across sectors:
logExportsst = α + β1 logUncertaintyt +
∑
s
{
β2s logExch Ratet × Sectors
+ β3s logPPIUS,st × Sectors + β4s logGDPUS,t × Sectors
+ β5s logOil Pricet × Sectors + β6s logOil Uncertaintyt × Sectors
+ β7sRiskfreeCAN,t × Sectors
}
+ Sectors + Quartert + Yeart + ust.
(1.1)
The sectoral producer price index (PPIUS,st) controls for the price index Pis in
the demand function; GDPUS,t controls for U.S. income Yi; and RiskfreeCAN,t, the
risk-free interest rate in Canada, controls for financial costs common to all firms in
all sectors. The oil price and oil price uncertainty variables are added because of the
specificity of the relationship between the price of crude oil and the Canadian currency.
All controls are interacted with sector fixed effects, allowing exports from dif-
ferent sectors to react differently to changes in these variables, and, in the following
specifications, allowing the heterogeneous effect of uncertainty to be properly identi-
fied. Sector, quarter, and year fixed effects additionally control for any unobserved
sector-specific, quarter-specific, or year-specific factors, such as constant technologi-
cal differences (e.g. production costs), seasonality, or other economic conditions. The
errors are clustered at the sector level, but results are robust to clustering by year and
to allowing for general heteroskedasticity. Additional specifications test for differen-
tiated effects of uncertainty on exports of different sectors by interacting exchange
rate uncertainty with either sector fixed effects or sector-specific financial characteris-
tics (asset tangibility, external finance dependence, and share of exports coming from
small or medium firms). All variables are expressed in natural logarithmic terms,
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except for the risk-free rate and the sectoral financial characteristics (when included),
which are already expressed in percentage points.
This specification assumes that uncertainty perceived in the current period about
next period’s exchange rate affects exports in the current period. Exporters worry
about current uncertainty when the goods they ship in the current period will be paid
for in the next period.8 The robustness section explores alternative timing assump-
tions.
In a second series of regressions I use as dependent variable the number of prod-
uct varieties exported from Canada to the United States in a given manufacturing
industry and in a given time period. I can thus test whether (and how) the extensive
margin of trade (the number of product varieties exported in a given industry) is
affected by exchange rate uncertainty, or whether all the adjustment happens at the
intensive margin (the quantity of a given product variety being exported).9 Choosing
this dependent variable has the additional benefit of being less prone to measurement
error. A given product is only recorded as exported or not (a binary outcome) rather
than being recorded in value and then deflated using a price index.
1.3.3 Measuring exchange rate uncertainty
The measures of exchange rate uncertainty most used in the literature include
past volatility (e.g. standard deviation) of the exchange rate and the volatility of the
errors implied by a (G)ARCH model of exchange rate.10 In this analysis, the preferred
8A survey performed by the Association for Financial Professionals distributed to Canadian and
American senior-level corporate practitioners finds that open accounts and letters of credit are widely
used by businesses. In both cases, the payment for the goods sold is received after the goods have
been delivered.
9A similar methodology is used in Manova (2013).
10In his survey, McKenzie (1999) finds that the measure of exchange rate uncertainty used by
researchers does not significantly affect their estimation results.
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measure used is the square root of the average squared (log) change in the nominal
exchange rate over the previous six months. For a given quarter t starting on the first
day of month m, the measure of uncertainty is measured as
σt ≡
[
1
6
×
6∑
i=1
(xm−i − xm−1−i)2
]1/2
, (1.2)
where xm is the natural logarithm of the average nominal exchange rate during month
m. The use of the average change in the previous two quarters ensures that the rel-
evant exchange rate data is available to agents when they make their decisions and
further alleviates endogeneity concerns. The real exchange rate, calculated using
consumer price indexes, is highly correlated with the nominal exchange rate, with a
coefficient of correlation of 0.95. The results of the analysis below can therefore be
interpreted in terms of either the nominal or the real exchange rate. The nominal
exchange rate is used to minimize measurement error.
In Section 1.5.2, I obtain regression results with four alternative measures of
exchange rate uncertainty: past daily volatility, volatility predicted by a GARCH
model, the degree of disagreement among forecasters and volatility implied by cur-
rency option prices. While past volatility and GARCH measures are widely used in
the literature and are calculated only from historical exchange rate data, the two
other measures have not been used in this literature and theoretically capture more
precisely the concept of forward-looking uncertainty. The four measures are strongly
but imperfectly correlated, suggesting that they capture slightly different phenom-
ena. Nevertheless, the regression results obtained with the different measures of
uncertainty are all broadly similar.
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1.3.4 Data
I estimate the baseline regressions using a panel dataset containing quarterly data
for 21 manufacturing industries. Over the sample period, manufactured goods rep-
resented around 65 percent of Canadian exports and exports represented 33 percent
of Canadian GDP. Canadian sectoral exports to the United States are obtained from
Statistics Canada’s Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database.11 Goods
are classified according to the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature at the 6-digit
level. I use the concordance tables developed by Pierce & Schott (2012) to aggregate
goods into 3-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) manu-
facturing industries.12 Exports are reported in Canadian dollars. I use the Canadian
industrial product price indexes from Statistics Canada to deflate values. The result-
ing series covers the time period 1988Q1-2015Q4 and is expressed in terms of 2010
prices. Table 1.1 contains summary statistics by industry. By far the most important
industry in terms of export value is transportation equipment (336). After adjusting
for price, exports of most sectors have a standard deviation-to-mean ratio ranging
from 0.35 to 0.45. The main exceptions are the relatively volatile clothing indus-
try (315) and the stable paper manufacturing industry (322).
The number of product varieties exported from Canada to the United States in
each manufacturing sector is measured as the number of HS-10 products with a value
of exports greater than zero in a given NAICS-3 industry. Industries are assigned us-
ing the Pierce & Schott (2012) tables. The HS-10 trade data is obtained from the USA
Trade Online database of the U.S. Census Bureau and is available annually from 1992.
11Data on Canadian exports to the U.S. are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and then shared
with Statistics Canada.
12I use the tables converting HS10 product codes into 2007 NAICS7 industries for U.S. imports.
The product codes not included in these tables are converted manually.
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I obtain sectoral price indexes for the United States from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ Producer Price Index database. I obtain the U.S. real GDP, the
CAD-USD exchange rate, and oil price (WTI) data from the Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Oil price uncertainty
is constructed using the methodology described above for exchange rate uncertainty.
I obtain the Canadian risk-free interest rate (the interest rate on a 3-month Trea-
sury bill) from Statistics Canada. Figure 1.1 plots the exchange rate (left axis) and
exchange rate uncertainty (right axis, dashed line) over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period.
High uncertainty does not seem to be caused by, or to cause, a strong or a weak
Canadian currency. In fact, the correlation between the two series is only -0.18.
I use two direct measures of financial constraints: asset tangibility and exter-
nal finance dependence. Asset tangibility is the ratio of a firm’s property, plant
and equipment to its total assets.13 External finance dependence is the fraction
of capital expenditures that cannot be financed by current operational cash flow
(Capital expenditure - Cash flowCapital expenditure ). I construct these measures following the literature and us-
ing firm-level data from Compustat, which contains most publicly-traded U.S. firms.14
For each firm that existed in the database at some point between 1988 and 2015, I
compute the two measures by taking the median for the years for which data is avail-
able. I then take the median of each measure for all firms in a given sector.15
Table 1.2 contains the financial variables for different sectors. Industries dif-
13Intangible assets include, among others, research and development and goodwill.
14U.S. firms are used because the number of Canadian firms available in Compustat is too small
in some industries to be representative. Furthermore, Rajan & Zingales (1998), who introduced the
measure of external finance dependence, argue that firms’ need for external finance is contingent
on the industry to which they belong for technological reasons. The same argument can be made
for asset tangibility. Using the measures for Canadian industries further assumes that the type of
industry-specific technology used in U.S. firms in similar to the type of technology used in Canadian
firms.
15The measures that I obtain are similar to those reported in Chor & Manova (2012), computed
using U.S. firms between 1996 and 2005.
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fer greatly. Miscellaneous products (339), Computer and electronic products (334),
and Electrical equipment (335) are the industries that rely most heavily on external
financing.16 On the other hand, many industries do not need any external financ-
ing over the studied time period. The Paper (322) as well as Petroleum and coal
products (324) industries have the most tangible assets whereas the Clothing (315),
Leather products (316), and Computer and electronic products (334) industries have
the least tangible assets. It is interesting to note that these two variables are nega-
tively related, with a correlation coefficient of -0.38.
The last column of Table 1.2 contains the share of exports produced by SMEs
(small and medium enterprises, defined as hiring 0-499 employees) for each industry.
The annual data is obtained from Statistics Canada and is averaged over the 2010-
2015 period.17 Exporters in the Transportation equipment (336) industry are almost
all large and those in the textile-related industries (313, 314, 315, 316) are almost all
small.
1.4 Results
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 display the main results of the empirical analysis. Column 1 of
Table 1.3 contains the estimated results for the first specification, equation (1.1). On
average, an increase of one percent in exchange rate uncertainty leads to a decrease
of 0.9 percent in exports. This average effect however obscures larger, heterogeneous
effects across sectors. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.5 contain the results estimated
using a second specification in which exchange rate uncertainty is interacted with
sector fixed effects. The results show that nine out of the 21 sectors are significantly
16NAICS industry 325 (Chemical products) is excluded from all regressions since its measure of
external finance dependence is extremely high, with a ratio of 11.
17The earliest available year is 2010. In the regressions, the share of exports produced by SMEs is
assumed to be exogenous. In reality, it may reflect firms’ heterogeneous reactions to exchange rate
uncertainty over the previous years and may cause the estimates to be biased.
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negatively affected by exchange rate risk. Among these sectors, a one-percent increase
in exchange rate uncertainty leads to an average decrease of 6.53 percent in exports.
Alternatively, an increase of one standard deviation in (log) uncertainty reduces ex-
ports by 3.2 percent. The remaining sectors are either not significantly affected or
significantly positively affected. This confirms findings in the existing literature that
aggregate effects can be small and go in either direction due to heterogeneous disag-
gregated effects.
One contribution of this chapter is to examine the reasons behind such hetero-
geneous results. The third specification tests for the role of two commonly used
measures of financial frictions: external finance dependence and asset tangibility. Re-
sults are presented in the second column of Table 1.3. If being financially constrained
prevents firms from efficiently handling exchange rate risk, as has been found in the
literature, then external finance dependence should worsen (i.e., make more negative)
the effect of uncertainty on exports whereas asset tangibility should make the effect
more positive (or less negative). The regression results suggest that the effect of as-
set tangibility is indeed positive, but not statistically significant, while the effect of
external finance dependence appears to be non-existent.
One possible explanation for these surprising results is that financial markets
are more developed in Canada than in countries for which financial frictions have
been found to matter, so that on average, these measures of financial frictions do not
show a statistically significant effect. An alternative and potentially complementary
explanation is that these measures of financial frictions do matter, but differently
for different firms. In order to test this theory, the fourth specification tests for the
possibility that firms could be differently affected by financial frictions because of
their differences in size by further interacting uncertainty and measures of financial
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constraints with the share of sectoral exports coming from SMEs. The results are
presented in the third column of Table 1.3.18 The results show that external finance
dependence has a significantly more negative effect on exports in sectors with smaller
firms. In fact, in an industry composed only of large firms, a higher level of ex-
ternal finance dependence results in a significantly less negative effect of exchange
rate uncertainty on exports (the coefficient on log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps is pos-
itive). In an industry composed only of SMEs, it makes the effect more negative
(the sum of the coefficient on log Uncertt×Ext Fin Deps and of 100× the coefficient
on log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs is negative). These results suggest that
external finance dependence is, as suggested in the literature, a measure of financial
frictions, but not necessarily for larger firms. One possible explanation regarding why
this effect has not been found in previous studies is that Canadian financial markets
could be more developed (especially for larger firms) than those of countries previ-
ously studied. The results in column 3 also suggest that sectors with relatively larger
firms benefit more from asset tangibility than those with relatively smaller firms. The
theoretical model introduced in the second chapter of this dissertation proposes mech-
anisms explaining the different effects of financial constraints on firms of differing sizes.
The results obtained using the number of exported product varieties as dependent
variable are presented in Table 1.4 and columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.5. They widely
confirm the results obtained for total exports. On average, the effect of exchange rate
uncertainty on the number of exported varieties is negative and highly significant. A
one-percent increase in uncertainty results in a decrease of more than 3 percent in the
number of exported varieties.19 The sectoral results show that, for most industries,
18The coefficients on interacted variables appear small in magnitude since the three interaction
variables (Ext Fin Deps, Asset Tangs, and Share SMEs) are expressed in percentage terms.
19The coefficients contained in Table 1.3 cannot be directly compared with the coefficients of
Table 1.4 because they come from datasets with different frequencies. The large average effect of
exchange rate uncertainty does not necessarily reflect a larger adjustment at the extensive margin
of trade and could reflect the accumulated effect of uncertainty over several quarters.
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the effect of uncertainty on the extensive margin of exports is qualitatively the same
as the effect on exports overall. This finding suggests that the effect on the extensive
and intensive margins of exports typically go in the same direction. Interestingly,
while asset tangibility plays a similar role in both sets of regression, external finance
dependence does not seem to matter as much in the extensive margin of trade’s re-
sponse to exchange rate uncertainty.
Table 1.6 contains additional regression results obtained separately for sectors
negatively (columns 1 and 3) and positively affected (columns 2 and 4) by exchange
rate uncertainty identified from column 1 of Table 1.5 (disregarding statistical signif-
icance). I find that financial frictions play a much stronger role in sectors negatively
affected by uncertainty and no role at all in sectors positively affected. Hence the
heterogeneity in the effect of exchange rate uncertainty that can be identified from
measures of financial frictions should be interpreted as applying only to negatively-
affected sectors.
The estimation results also suggest that both the effect of exchange rate uncer-
tainty on exports and the effect of financial frictions on firms’ responses to uncertainty
are economically significant. Figure 1.2 contains the predicted percentage change in
exports for different hypothetical sectors when uncertainty increases by one standard
deviation and shows that the effect can reach several percentage points. Figures 1.2a
and 1.2b show the change in exports in sectors with the average degree of external
finance dependence but with differing levels of asset tangibility, with either a low
(20 percent) or a high (80 percent) share of exports coming from SMEs. The change
in exports is more positive the higher the tangibility, especially for sectors dominated
by large firms. Hence, asset tangibility appears to be crucial for large firms’ ability
to adapt to risk. Low tangibility results in a statistically and economically significant
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decrease in exports of several percentage points following the increase in uncertainty,
regardless of the size distribution of exporters. Figures 1.2c and 1.2d show the change
in exports in sectors with the average level of asset tangibility but with varying de-
grees of external finance dependence. The direction of the effect of external finance
dependence depends on the composition of the sector: in a sector dominated by large
firms, high external finance dependence leads to a more positive effect of uncertainty.
The opposite is true of a sector composed of mostly small firms.
1.5 Robustness
1.5.1 Alternative timing assumptions
Existing theoretical models of the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on inter-
national trade can come to different conclusions when using different assumptions
about the timing of the decisions made by the firm. More specifically, whether firms
decide the quantity to export before or after deciding the quantity to produce can
determine whether uncertainty has a positive or a negative effect on exports. On the
one hand, if the production decision happens first, the firm may be able to observe
the exchange rate (or the realization of the uncertain outcome) before deciding the
quantity to be exported. In this case, higher uncertainty can lead to higher potential
profits, and higher exports if the realization turns out favorable.20 On the other hand,
if the exporting decision must be made first, it must be made before the exchange
rate is realized and more uncertainty can lead to lower exports.
The timing assumption made in the empirical analysis does not rely on whether
it is the production or the exporting decision that happens first. It only relies on the
payment for the exported goods being received after the goods have been produced.
20See, for example, Dellas & Zilberfarb (1993).
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However, if the decision to export at time t is made at time t − 1, then exchange
rate uncertainty perceived at time t − 1 is relevant. Column 2 of Table 1.7 contains
regression results obtained with the first lag of the uncertainty measure.
The payment for the exported goods may also be made at or around the time
of shipping. In this case, exchange rate uncertainty matters only if the decision to
export must be made ahead of time, possibly because production happens after the
decision to export has been made. In this case, it is the measure of perceived un-
certainty in the previous period (t− 1) that may affect exports. Hence, the first lag
should also be used.
One last possibility comes from the way the measure of exchange rate uncertainty
is built. The main analysis assumes that agents use past volatility of exchange rate in
order to form their current perception of future exchange rate uncertainty. It could
also be that agents use current volatility of the exchange rate instead to form their
perception. In this case, the first lead of the measure of exchange rate uncertainty
would matter for exports. Column 3 of Table 1.7 contains regression results obtained
with the first lead of the uncertainty measure. The striking similarity between the
results reached using different timing assumptions suggests that the order in which
different steps happen has little impact on the way financial frictions shape the rela-
tionship between exchange rate uncertainty and exports.
1.5.2 Alternative measures of exchange rate uncertainty
In this section, I obtain regression results with four alternative measures of ex-
change rate uncertainty: past daily volatility, volatility predicted by a GARCH model,
the degree of disagreement among forecasters and volatility implied by option prices.
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The past daily volatility measure is calculated as the square root of the average
daily squared (log) change in the nominal exchange rate over the quarter preceding
quarter t. It measures the volatility of the exchange rate at a higher frequency than
the measure used in the main analysis. It is therefore noisier, but also has the poten-
tial to capture events missed by the measure using monthly changes.
The GARCH measure is obtained from a GARCH(2,2) model. One advantage of
this measure is that it takes into account that periods of high (or low) volatility tend
to happen in clusters rather than randomly. It uses past volatility to predict future
volatility. The GARCH model that I estimate is
xt − xt−1 = α0 + α1(xt−1 − xt−2) + α2[log(OilPricet)− log(OilPricet−1)] + ut
(1.3)
ut = σtet, et ∼ iidN(0, 1) (1.4)
σ2t = β +
p∑
i=1
βiu
2
t−i +
q∑
j=1
βjσ
2
t−j. (1.5)
I include the price of oil in equation (1.3) since there is strong evidence that it affects
the CAD-USD exchange rate. I estimate the variance equation (1.5) with p = 2 and
q = 2 following the results of Engle’s Lagrange-multiplier test. I find no evidence of
serial correlation in the disturbances ut. Fitted volatility σˆ2t proxies for exchange rate
uncertainty.
I calculate forecasters’ disagreement using the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts com-
piled by Aspen Publishers. This monthly survey contains forecasts made by financial
institutions about what the CAD-USD exchange rate will be three months later. I cal-
culate disagreement by computing for each month the difference between the highest
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and the lowest forecasts.21 I then average this monthly measure within each quarter.
Finally, I obtain option-implied volatility of the CAD-USD exchange rate from
Bloomberg. Option-implied volatility is calculated from option prices. Investors may
purchase options to exchange Canadian dollars for U.S. dollars (or vice versa) at dif-
ferent exchange rates and at different dates in the future. The Black-Scholes formula
predicts the theoretical price of a given option (for a risk-neutral investor) by tak-
ing into account the current exchange rate, the exchange rate secured in the option
contract, the option’s maturity and the expected volatility of the exchange rate until
maturity. Since all variables, including option prices, are available in the data ex-
cept expected volatility, the formula can be used to deduct the degree of volatility
consistent with the observed prices. I use the series calculated from prices of options
with a 3-month maturity to capture markets’ uncertainty about the movements of
the exchange rate in the following quarter.
The different measures of uncertainty are available for different time periods.
While the volatility and GARCH measures are built using only historical exchange
rate data (and oil price data in the case of the GARCH measure), the forecast dis-
agreement measure is available from 1993Q1 and the implied volatility measure is
available from 1999Q1. The five measures of exchange rate uncertainty used in this
analysis, normalized to 100 in 1999Q1, are plotted in Figure 1.3 and Table 1.8 con-
tains their bilateral coefficients of correlation. It is clear that while ex-post and
forward-looking measures are positively correlated, they are not perfectly correlated
and capture fairly different phenomena. Interestingly, the option-implied measure of
uncertainty is highly correlated with the GARCH measure. This suggests that market
participants base (or expect other market participants to base) their expectations of
21The small number of forecasters prevents the use of more sophisticated measures of disagreement.
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future volatility on past volatility and incorporate little forward-looking information.
The disagreement measure, on the other hand, suggests that forecasters do incorpo-
rate a fair amount of forward-looking (private) information in their forecasts of the
level of the exchange rate so that this measure is the least correlated with the others.
Table 1.9 compares the results obtained from the most complete specification
using the five measures of uncertainty for the 1999Q1-2015Q4 period.22 Using this
shorter sample has two main effects on the regression results. First, the smaller
number of observations reduces the number of degrees of freedom, which generally
tends to increase standard errors. Second, since the period dropped (1988-1998)
saw low and less volatile levels of uncertainty, the effect can be better identified
with the smaller sample. All measures of uncertainty confirm the qualitative results
obtained with the larger sample. Hence, when accounting for the differential effects,
the measure of uncertainty used seems to matter little.
1.5.3 Other robustness tests
One plausible alternative interpretation of the empirical results described in Sec-
tion 1.4 is that Canadian firms could be uncertain about the future demand from U.S.
consumers for their products. More financially-constrained firms could find it harder
to manage this uncertainty. Hence it could be that the effect attributed to exchange
rate uncertainty in fact captures the effect of demand uncertainty. One measure of
macroeconomic uncertainty that has been frequently used in the macroeconomic lit-
erature is the VIX index. The VIX index is a measure of macroeconomic volatility
computed and published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange that measures the
volatility implied by prices for options to trade the S&P 500 stock index. A higher
value of the VIX index indicates that financial markets are more uncertain about the
22This is the longest period for which the five measures are available.
22
future profitability of U.S. firms. This situation could both cause greater uncertainty
about the CAD/USD exchange rate and affect Canadian exports to the U.S. directly,
thereby resulting in omitted variable bias on the coefficients of interest in the regres-
sions. The coefficient of correlation between the VIX index and the monthly volatility
measure of exchange rate uncertainty however only comes out to 0.30. Furthermore,
adding the VIX index as an additional control to the regressions, interacted with sec-
tor fixed effects, does not modify the qualitative effects found in the main empirical
analysis and only slightly affects the magnitudes of the coefficients. The coefficients
of interest are presented in column 2 of Table 1.10. Column 1 reproduces the baseline
results presented in column 3 of Table 1.3.
Since the sample period contains the U.S. Great Recession and the financial crisis
that preceded it, a second alternative interpretation of the main empirical results is
that the relationship found between exchange rate uncertainty and Canadian sectoral
exports held only for that period and that the effect estimated in the main analysis is
in fact capturing the effect of the financial crisis on exports. As a second robustness
check, I create a crisis dummy variable which takes the value of one between 2007Q1
and 2009Q4 and zero during all other periods. I interact this crisis variable with
all regressors containing exchange rate uncertainty. As a third robustness check, I
estimate the baseline regression for the pre-financial crisis period of 1988Q1-2006Q4.
Finally, in order to ensure that other macroeconomic events are not driving the inter-
actions found between exchange rate uncertainty and financial constraints, I estimate
the regression with period-specific (Quarter × Year) fixed effects. The results of these
three robustness tests are presented in column 3 of Table 1.10 and columns 2 and 3
of Table 1.11, and confirm that the heterogeneity in the effects of uncertainty is not
caused by macroeconomic conditions.
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A third alternative interpretation of the main empirical results is that Canadian
firms could be affected by exchange rate uncertainty because of the inputs that they
import from the U.S. If firms pay for their imported inputs after they have ordered
them, higher exchange rate uncertainty causes higher uncertainty about costs and
firms that are not as financially robust could find it harder to manage the risk. A
reduction in imported inputs would then result in a reduction of production, which
could result in a reduction of exports. Hence, the observed impact of exchange rate
uncertainty on exports would at least partially be caused by the importing behavior
of firms rather than their exporting behavior. As a robustness check, I use the ratio of
exports to production by sector as the dependent variable. The identifying assump-
tion is that all production (both for domestic sales and for foreign sales) relies on
the same share of imported inputs. Hence, if exports are impacted by exchange rate
uncertainty only because of a change in imported inputs instead of specific exporting
decisions, exports and production would move exactly proportionally. Their ratio
would then not be affected by exchange rate uncertainty. Column 2 of Table 1.12
contains the results of a regression for which the log of the ratio of exports to pro-
duction is used as independent variable.23 The coefficients of interest remain mostly
similar, confirming that the heterogeneity in the response of exports to exchange rate
uncertainty results from firms’ exporting, not importing, decision.
A fourth alternative interpretation of the main empirical results is that the ef-
fect of firm size could be non-monotonic. Since firm size is measured as the share of
exports coming from small and medium firms (1-499 employees), it is possible that
medium-size firms drive the results associated to smaller firms and that small firms in
fact behave more like large firms. In this robustness check, I replace the Share SMEs
variable with the share of exports coming from small firms (Share Smalls), defined
23For data availability reasons, this regression does not include the Textile (313) and Textile
Products (314) industries, and covers a slightly shorter period (1988Q1-2012Q3).
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as firms with 1-100 employees. The results are presented in column 3 of Table 1.12
and show that small firms’ differential effects of financial constraints are even larger,
suggesting that the effect of firm size is monotonic.
Finally, in a last robustness check, I control for a potential third-country effect
that could come from the distinct trade relationship between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. I add Mexican GDP, interacted with sector fixed effects, to
the regression.24 The results are presented in column 4 of Table 1.12 and remain
unchanged.
1.6 Conclusion
The economic consequences of uncertainty are receiving growing attention from
researchers. In this chapter, I study empirically how a specific type of uncertainty,
exchange rate uncertainty, affects firms’ exporting decisions. Building on progress
made by the recent literature, I focus on the role of financial frictions. I use data on
Canadian exports to the United States and find that exports in industries in which
firms are more financially constrained are more negatively affected by exchange rate
uncertainty. This result holds when looking at either the total margin or the extensive
margin of exports. Sectors in which firms have more tangible assets see their exports
decrease less in times of high uncertainty. This is even more true of sectors composed
of mostly large firms. I also find that the effect of external finance dependence on the
relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade is not homogeneous and
depends on the size of the exporters. In sectors in which most exporters are small or
medium firms, external finance dependence acts as a financial constraint and exports
are more negatively affected by uncertainty. In sectors in which most exporters are
large, a higher degree of external dependence has little effect.
24Historical sectoral production data are not freely available for Mexico.
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The fact that exchange rate uncertainty and financial frictions interact to af-
fect the behavior of Canadian exporting firms is especially unexpected considering
the high level of financial development in the countries involved, including the wide
availability of financial hedging instruments. This finding suggests that the effect
of exchange rate uncertainty on trade between different country pairs is potentially
significantly more negative.
This chapter confirms existing empirical results about the role of financial frictions
in the relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and international trade, and
uncovers new patterns. A natural next step is to design a theoretical model that
suggests mechanisms to explain these findings. This is precisely what I do in the next
chapter of this dissertation.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Exchange rate and exchange rate uncertainty, 1988Q1-2015Q4
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(a) Effect of asset tangibility,
share of SMEs = 20%
(b) Effect of asset tangibility,
share of SMEs = 80%
(c) Effect of external finance dependence,
share of SMEs = 20%
(d) Effect of external finance dependence,
share of SMEs = 80%
Figure 1.2: Percentage change in exports in response to a one-standard-deviation
increase in exchange rate uncertainty
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Figure 1.3: Different measures of exchange rate uncertainty
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1.8 Tables
Million CAD, 2010 prices
NAICS-3 Mean St Dev Min Max
311 Food 2285 1010 596 4411
312 Beverage and tobacco 343 130 159 658
313 Textiles 235 114 54 449
314 Textile products 107 44 38 215
315 Clothing 323 212 69 760
316 Leather products 41 18 16 92
321 Wood products 2401 883 1071 4335
322 Paper 3631 639 2553 4774
323 Printing and related activities 320 134 120 605
324 Petroleum and coal products 2536 977 617 4223
325 Chemical 4879 1699 1515 7343
326 Plastics and rubber products 1712 639 557 2703
327 Non-metallic mineral products 567 216 251 1044
331 Primary metal 5403 1241 2249 7225
332 Fabricated metal products 1575 526 631 3030
333 Machinery 3237 917 1334 4528
334 Computer and electronic products 2394 857 1385 6195
335 Electrical equipment 1036 411 320 1778
336 Transportation equipment 13821 2979 7815 19376
337 Furniture and related products 1037 500 330 2000
339 Miscellaneous 467 209 132 928
This table contains summary statistics about Canadian sectoral exports to the U.S.
over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period. Exports values are extracted in HS-6 classification
and translated into NAICS-3 classification. Exports are deflated using industrial
product price indexes obtained from Statistics Canada.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of Canadian manufacturing exports to the United
States
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External Fin. Asset Share of
Dependence Tangibility SMEs
NAICS-3 (%) (%) (%)
311 Food -3.3 31.0 48.0
312 Beverage and tobacco 33.5 21.9 67.3
313 Textile -9.0 33.5 98.7
314 Textile products -16.7 29.9 95.5
315 Clothing 47.7 12.1 89.8
316 Leather products -81.9 11.1 100
321 Wood products -17.0 32.0 47.2
322 Paper -8.3 44.6 38.3
323 Printing and related activities -17.2 32.3 61.5
324 Petroleum and coal products 7.1 51.1 32.1
325 Chemical 11114.8 8.8 50.8
326 Plastics and rubber products 11.8 34.2 58.1
327 Non-metallic mineral products 3.9 43.0 71.5
331 Primary metal 0.3 35.6 53.2
332 Fabricated metal products -24.6 26.0 82.4
333 Machinery 10.2 16.4 73.8
334 Computer and electronic products 73.8 11.3 65.9
335 Electrical equipment 61.2 18.0 60.2
336 Transportation equipment -0.3 22.0 8.0
337 Furniture and related products -108.4 25.0 79.3
339 Miscellaneous 164.5 12.0 39.4
This table contains financial indicators for 21 manufacturing industries. External finance
dependence and asset tangibility are calculated from Compustat’s database using U.S. public
firms active at some point over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period. External finance dependence is
calculated as the share of capital expenditure that cannot be financed by current operational
cashflow. Asset tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets.
Both measures are first calculated at the firm level for every year of existence. I take the
median over the years of existence, and then the median over all firms in a given industry
to construct constant sectoral measures. Share of SMEs indicates the share of all Canadian
exports in a given sector coming from small or medium firms (0-499 employees). The annual
data is obtained from Statistics Canada. The average is taken over the 2010-2015 period.
Table 1.2: Financial characteristics of manufacturing industries
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
1 2 3
log Uncertt -0.009* -0.060 -0.184**
(-1.83) (-1.49) (-2.59)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps -0.00004 0.0015***
(-0.14) (3.51)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs 0.0019 0.0067***
(1.36) (3.01)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0016
(1.50)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.00002***
(-3.02)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.00007*
(-1.95)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Number obs 2240 2240 2240
R-squared(within) 0.918 0.918 0.919
This table presents estimates obtained using a panel dataset covering 21 manufacturing
sectors and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period. The dependent variable is the log of Canadian
exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices. The control variables include the log of
exchange rate uncertainty as well as the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer
price index, U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free
rate. All controls except exchange rate uncertainty are interacted with sector fixed effects.
In column 2, exchange rate uncertainty is interacted with sectoral measures of external
finance dependence and asset tangibility (both in percentage). In column 3, exchange rate
uncertainty is additionally interacted with sectoral measures of the share of exports coming
from SMEs; and triply interacted with share of SMEs and external finance dependence,
and share of SMEs and asset tangibility. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.3: Financial constraints, exchange rate uncertainty and the total margin of
trade
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Dependent variable log Number of varieties
1 2 3
log Uncertt -0.036*** -0.100*** -0.119**
(-3.06) (-3.88) (-2.39)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0003 0.00006
(1.51) (0.15)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs 0.002** 0.005***
(2.78) (3.08)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0007
(0.78)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs 0.000003
(0.41)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.00006*
(-1.82)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE - - -
Year FE No No No
Number obs 480 480 480
R-squared(within) 0.761 0.766 0.770
This table presents estimates obtained using a panel dataset covering 21 manufacturing
sectors and the 1992-2015 period. The dependent variable is the log of the number of prod-
uct varieties exported. The control variables include the log of exchange rate uncertainty
as well as the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer price index, U.S. GDP,
oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All controls except
exchange rate uncertainty are interacted with sector fixed effects. In column 2, exchange
rate uncertainty is interacted with sectoral measures of external finance dependence and
asset tangibility (both in percentage). In column 3, exchange rate uncertainty is addi-
tionally interacted with sectoral measures of the share of exports coming from SMEs; and
triply interacted with share of SMEs and external finance dependence, and share of SMEs
and asset tangibility. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. T-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 1.4: Financial constraints, exchange rate uncertainty and the extensive margin
of trade
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices) log Number of varieties
NAICS Manufacturing sector Total effect T-statistics Total effect T-statistics
1 2 3 4
311 Food 0.029** (2.33) -0.032*** (-21.41)
312 Beverage and tobacco -0.028* (-2.08) -0.012*** (-11.27)
313 Textile -0.087*** (-5.72) -0.129*** (-47.98)
314 Textile products -0.041** (-2.62) -0.079*** (-30.77)
315 Clothing -0.119*** (-8.35) -0.093*** (-41.57)
316 Leather products 0.077*** (5.70) -0.051*** (-29.97)
321 Wood products -0.036** (-2.49) -0.032*** (-30.48)
322 Paper 0.034** (2.53) 0.011*** (9.42)
323 Printing and related activities 0.094*** (6.88) 0.003** (2.42)
324 Petroleum and coal products 0.062*** (4.77) 0.056*** (70.06)
326 Plastics and rubber products -0.001 (-0.08) 0.003* (1.74)
327 Non-metallic mineral products 0.010 (0.78) -0.030*** (-22.26)
331 Primary metal 0.022 (1.56) -0.031*** (-25.51)
332 Fabricated metal products -0.032** (-2.45) -0.004** (-2.74)
333 Machinery 0.012 (0.95) -0.034*** (-21.27)
334 Computer and electronic products -0.110*** (-7.05) -0.049*** (-46.22)
335 Electrical equipment -0.019 (-1.51) -0.030*** (-17.12)
336 Transportation equipment -0.071*** (-5.62) -0.028*** (-17.76)
337 Furniture and related products -0.064*** (-5.00) -0.132*** (-81.29)
339 Miscellaneous 0.012 (0.90) -0.046*** (-27.16)
This table presents estimates obtained using a panel dataset covering 20 manufacturing sectors and
the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period for columns 1-2 and the 1992-2015 period for columns 3-4. The dependent
variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices in columns 1-2 and the
log of the number of product varieties exported in columns 3-4. The control variables include the
log of exchange rate uncertainty as well as the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer
price index, U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All
controls are interacted with sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. The
reported coefficients are the total effect of uncertainty for each sector. T-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.5: Exchange rate uncertainty and sector-level trade
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices) log Number of varieties
Negatively Positively Negatively Positively
affected affected affected affected
1 2 3 4
log Uncertt -0.360*** 0.097 -0.298** -0.118
(-3.89) (0.73) (-2.58) (-0.99)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0045** 0.00018 0.0034* -0.00015
(4.10) (0.84) (2.13) (-0.70)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs 0.0147*** -0.0012 0.0126* 0.0041
(3.37) (-0.40) (2.42) (1.59)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0033** -0.0016 0.0023 0.00094
(2.74) (-0.92) (1.26) (0.60)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.00006*** -0.000014*** -0.000037 0.000005**
(-4.09) (-4.53) (-1.65) (2.86)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs - 0.00015** 0.000018 -0.00014 -0.000049
(2.64) (0.45) (-1.64) (-1.35)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes - -
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Number obs 1232 1008 264 216
R-squared(within) 0.933 0.910 0.812 0.698
This table presents estimates obtained using a panel dataset covering 20 manufacturing sectors
and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period for columns 1-2 and the 1992-2015 period for columns 3-4. The
dependent variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices in columns
1-2 and the log of the number of product varieties exported in columns 2-3. The control variables
are the same as in Tables 1.3 and 1.4. Columns 1 and 3 include only sectors negatively affected
by uncertainty identified from Table 1.5 (NAICS codes 312, 313, 314, 315, 321, 326, 332, 334, 335,
336, 337). Columns 2 and 4 include only sectors positively affected by uncertainty identified from
Table 1.5 (NAICS codes 311, 316, 322, 323, 324, 327, 331, 333, 339). Standard errors are clustered
at the sector level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneous effect of uncertainty on negatively and positively affected
industries
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
Current First lag First lead
log Uncertt -0.184** -0.130* -0.134
(-2.59) (-1.82) (-1.61)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0011**
(3.51) (3.31) (2.39)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs 0.0067*** 0.0047* 0.0054**
(3.01) (1.88) (2.42)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0016 0.0015 0.0009
(1.50) (1.38) (0.79)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Share SMEs -0.00002*** -0.00002** -0.00002**
(-3.02) (-2.78) (-2.11)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs × Share SMEs -0.00007* -0.00006 -0.00005
(-1.95) (-1.60) (-1.39)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Number obs 2240 2240 2240
R-squared(within) 0.908 0.919 0.919
This table contains estimates obtained using different timing assumptions. The panel dataset
covers 20 manufacturing sectors and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period unless otherwise indicated. The
dependent variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices. The non-
reported control variables include the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer price
index, U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All
these controls are interacted with sector fixed effects. Sector, quarter and year fixed effects are
always included. Column 1 contains the baseline regression results, presented in column 3 of
Table 1.3. Column 2 includes instead the first lag of the measure of exchange rate uncertainty,
and column 3 includes instead the first lead. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.
The reported coefficients are the total effect of uncertainty for each sector. T-statistics are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 1.7: Alternative Timing Assumptions
Measures Vol monthly Vol daily GARCH Disagreement Option-implied
Vol monthly 1.00 0.78 0.79 0.37 0.71
Vol daily 1.00 0.85 0.33 0.73
GARCH 1.00 0.46 0.86
Disagreement 1.00 0.58
Option-implied 1.00
Table 1.8: Coefficients of correlation between different measures of exchange rate
uncertainty
36
Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
Measure of uncertainty Volatility Volatility GARCH Dis- Option-
Monthly Daily agreement implied
log Uncertt -0.148 -0.068 -0.156 -0.131* -0.284
(-1.63) (-0.88) (-1.09) (-2.06) (-1.07)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.00097** 0.0007* 0.0011 0.0014** 0.0033**
(2.22) (1.93) (1.47) (2.59) (2.10)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs 0.0044 0.0022 0.0041 0.0034** 0.0085
(1.50) (1.11) (1.09) (2.29) (1.23)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0023* 0.00077 0.0017 0.0019* 0.0037
(1.82) (0.78) (0.92) (1.90) (1.03)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.000015* -0.0000083 -0.0000096 -0.000016* -0.000038
(-2.03) (-1.56) (-0.95) (-1.75) (-1.51)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.000073 -0.000030 -0.000055 -0.000054* -0.00014
(-1.50) (-1.09) (-0.97) (-2.00) (-1.33)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs 1360 1360 1360 1360 1360
R-squared(within) 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.913 0.913
This table presents estimates obtained using a panel dataset covering 20 manufacturing industries
and the 1999Q1-2015Q4 period. The dependent variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S.
expressed in 2010 prices. The control variables include the log of exchange rate uncertainty as well
as the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer price index, U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil
price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All controls except exchange rate uncertainty
are interacted with sector fixed effects. Sector, quarter and year fixed effects are also included.
Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.9: Alternative measures of exchange rate uncertainty
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
1 2 3
log Uncertt -0.184** -0.228*** -0.138**
(-2.59) (-3.11) (-2.32)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0013***
(3.51) (4.11) (3.46)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs 0.0067*** 0.0082*** 0.0061***
(3.01) (3.95) (3.15)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0016 0.0021* 0.0010
(1.50) (1.93) (1.16)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.000024*** -0.000027*** -0.000024***
(-3.02) (-3.50) (-3.08)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.000072* -0.000094** -0.000066**
(-1.95) (-2.66) (-2.10)
VIX indext × Sectors No Yes No
log Uncertt × crisist -0.057*
(-2.01)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × crisist 0.00022*
(1.87)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × crisist 0.00046
(0.91)
log Uncertt × Sh SMEs × crisist 0.00046
(1.71)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs × crisist -0.0000005
(-0.29)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs × crisist -0.000005
(-0.53)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter × Year FE No No No
Number obs 2240 2080 2240
R-squared(within) 0.908 0.924 0.920
This table contains estimates obtained for robustness checks. The panel dataset covers 20 man-
ufacturing sectors and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period unless otherwise indicated. The dependent
variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices. The non-reported
control variables include the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer price index, U.S.
GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All these controls
are interacted with sector fixed effects. Sector, quarter and year fixed effects are always included.
Column 1 contains the baseline regression results, presented in column 3 of Table 1.3. Column 2
includes as additional controls the VIX index interacted with sector fixed effects and covers the
period 1990Q1-2015Q4. Column 3 interacts all controls including exchange rate uncertainty with
an additional dummy variable, crisist which takes a value of 1 between 2007Q1 and 2009Q4 and
zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. T-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.10: Robustness tests I: Macroeconomic conditions
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
1 2 3
log Uncertt -0.184** -0.133***
(-2.59) (-3.37)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0015*** 0.00096 ** 0.0015***
(3.51) (2.55) (3.44)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs 0.0067*** 0.0062*** 0.0067***
(3.01) (4.45) (2.95)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0016 0.00069 0.0016
(1.50) (0.283) (1.46)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.000024*** -0.000017** -0.000024***
(-3.02) (-2.43) (-2.96)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.000072* -0.000057** -0.000072*
(-1.95) (-2.27) (-1.91)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter × Year FE No No Yes
Number obs 2240 1520 2240
R-squared(within) 0.908 0.943 0.921
This table contains estimates obtained for robustness checks. The panel dataset covers 20
manufacturing sectors and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period unless otherwise indicated. The
dependent variable is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices.
The non-reported control variables include the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific
producer price index, U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian
risk-free rate. All these controls are interacted with sector fixed effects. Sector, quarter
and year fixed effects are always included. Column 1 contains the baseline regression
results, presented in column 3 of Table 1.3. Column 2 covers only the pre-crisis period
of 1988Q1-2006Q4. Column 3 has additional Quarter × Year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the sector level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.11: Robustness tests II: Macroeconomic conditions
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Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)?
1 2 3 4
log Uncertt -0.184** -0.175*** -0.143*** -0.180**
(-2.59) (-4.45) (-2.99) (-2.77)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0015*** 0.00095*** 0.0025*** 0.0017***
(3.51) (3.25) (3.68) (3.70)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs 0.0067*** 0.0061*** 0.0047*** 0.0075***
(3.01) (4.17) (3.52) (3.81)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0016 0.0020*** 0.0017
(1.50) (3.13) (1.72)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.000024*** -0.000015** -0.000026***
(-3.02) (-2.30) (-3.10)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.000072* -0.000078*** -0.000089**
(-1.95) (-3.01) (-2.63)
log Uncertt × Share Smalls 0.0032
(1.70)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh Smalls -0.00010***
(-3.46)
log Uncertt ×Asset Tangs × Sh Smalls -0.00013*
(-1.96)
log GDP Mexicot × Sectors No No No Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs 2240 1782 2240 2240
R-squared(within) 0.908 0.886 0.908 0.925
? unless otherwise indicated
This table contains estimates obtained for robustness checks. The panel dataset covers 20 manufac-
turing sectors and the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period unless otherwise indicated. The dependent variable
is the log of Canadian exports to the U.S. expressed in 2010 prices except for column 2. The non-
reported control variables include the log of the exchange rate, sector-specific producer price index,
U.S. GDP, oil price (WTI), oil price uncertainty and the Canadian risk-free rate. All these controls
are interacted with sector fixed effects. Sector, quarter and year fixed effects are always included.
Column 1 contains the baseline regression results, presented in column 3 of Table 1.3. Column 2 has
the share of exports to total Canadian production as dependent variable, covers the period 1988Q1-
2012Q3 and does not include the Textile (313) and Textile Products (314) industries. Column 3 uses
the share of exports coming from small firms (1-99 employees) instead of the share of exports coming
from SMEs (1-499 employees) as measure for firm size. Column 4 includes as additional control the
(log) real GDP of Mexico interacted with sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
sector level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.12: Robustness tests III: Other tests
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2 The effect of exchange rate uncertainty on inter-
national trade: The role of financial frictions - A
theoretical analysis
2.1 Introduction
The empirical literature on the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on interna-
tional trade is extensive. The theoretical literature is however much more sparse.
Early theoretical models on the relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and
international trade predict a negative effect: in times of high exchange rate uncer-
tainty and in the absence of hedging instruments, risk-averse entrepreneurs choose
to export less and instead concentrate on the domestic market.25 Ethier (1973) and
Baron (1976) however predicted that in countries where financial markets were de-
veloped, the liberalization of exchange rates would not significantly affect trade since
hedging instruments were available to firms or their shareholders.
Following puzzling empirical results, other researchers have designed models that
can explain how increases in exchange rate risk could instead lead to increases in
international trade. For example, Dellas & Zilberfarb (1993) show that if exports
contracts are designed as options for the firm, an increase in exchange rate volatility
increases the exporter’s potential profit and can result in a higher level of exports,
depending on the exporter’s degree of risk aversion. More recent literature on the
relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and trade lacks theoretical models.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I provide additional empirical evidence
25See Ethier (1973) and Clark (1973).
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about the role of financial frictions in the relationship between exchange rate uncer-
tainty and exports. I find that manufacturing shipments from Canada to the United
States are more negatively affected by this type of uncertainty in sectors where firms
are more financially constrained. Having more tangible capital, which can potentially
be used as collateral, makes the effect of uncertainty less negative, especially im sec-
tors where firms are large. Relying more on external financing, on the other hand,
makes the effect more negative and affects sectors with small firms more.
In this chapter, I introduce a theoretical model that rationalizes these empirical
findings. The model extends that of Manova (2013). Risk-neutral firms must borrow
from a lender to cover some of the costs of exporting. The lender charges an inter-
est rate above the risk-free rate because the repayment by the firm is only partially
guaranteed by collateral. In Manova (2013), uncertainty about the firm’s repayment
comes from limited contract enforcement. It is constant and independent of the firm’s
behavior. In contrast, in my model, uncertainty arises from exchange rate risk. The
exporting firm agrees on a price with its foreign customer, but this price is set in
the customer’s currency. Hence, before the exchange rate is realized, the exporting
firm cannot precisely predict its revenue in its own currency. This causes ex-ante
uncertainty regarding the firm’s ability to fully repay the lender after the exchange
rate is realized. Importantly, the firm’s pricing decision affects the likelihood that it
cannot fully repay.
The model introduced in this chapter differs from the existing literature in that
firms are negatively affected by exchange rate uncertainty even if they are risk-neutral.
The level of uncertainty affects the interest rates firms can obtain, which in turn af-
fect their decisions regarding production and exporting. If firms are assumed to be
risk averse in addition to being financially constrained, the role of financial frictions
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in the relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and exports is dampened but
remains qualitatively identical.
Exports from firms with varying degrees of external finance dependence and asset
tangibility are differently affected by exchange rate uncertainty since they represent
different potential levels of risk to their lender. Firms with more tangible assets are
less risky because they have more collateral to offer. Firms depending more heavily
on external finance can be more or less affected by exchange rate risk depending on
their size. Such firms borrow a greater share of their costs, and hence are more likely
to default. However, by borrowing larger amounts, they also offer higher potential
returns to lenders. As in other heterogeneous-firm models, smaller firms are also less
productive. In their case, greater external finance dependence leads their exports to
decrease even more in times of high exchange rate uncertainty.
The firm-level predictions of the model are therefore consistent with the empirical
results obtained in the first chapter of this dissertation. In order to verify that the
model can also reproduce the sector-level empirical patterns, I calibrate the model
to the Canadian economy, generate sectoral export series from the calibrated model,
and run the main empirical regressions I run in the first chapter on the simulated
data. The resulting coefficients are similar. As a further step, I test the model’s
mechanisms using data on syndicated lending to Canadian firms. I find that interest
rates are indeed higher for firms with less tangible capital and in periods of high un-
certainty. These results suggest that banks do take idiosyncratic and aggregate risks
into account when deciding which interest rates to charge firms.
In the last stage, I use the calibrated model to answer further questions about
the theoretical effect of exchange rate uncertainty on exports. First, I find that the
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amounts that different firms would be willing to pay in order to avoid exchange rate
uncertainty are considerable in dollar terms, but represent a relatively small fraction
of their profits. This suggests that the cost of hedging exchange rate exposure is
perceived by firms to be rather high relative to the benefit. Second, I examine the
effect of a hypothetical policy akin to providing additional collateral to financially-
constrained exporters on the negative effect of exchange rate uncertainty on exports.26
I find that this type of policy must be applied very widely to have a substantial effect.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the
theoretical model; Section 2.3 describes the implications of the model; Section 2.4
details the calibration strategy and simulated regressions; and Section 2.5 presents a
counterfactual analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section, I outline a theoretical model that rationalizes the empirical results
described in the first chapter of this dissertation. The model is inspired by Manova
(2013), who designs a Melitz (2003)-type, heterogeneous-firm trade model in which
different types of financial frictions reduce firms’ ability to export.
As in Manova (2013), firms must borrow from a lender to cover some of the costs
of exporting. The lender charges an interest rate above the risk-free rate because the
repayment by the firm is only partially guaranteed by collateral. In Manova (2013),
the uncertainty around the firm’s repayment comes from limited contract enforcement.
It is constant and independent of the firm’s behavior. In my model, time-varying un-
certainty arises instead from exchange rate risk. The exporting firm agrees on a price
with its customer, but this price is set in the customer’s currency. Hence, before the
26Note that this resembles an actual policy implemented by Export Development Canada.
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exchange rate is realized, the exporting firm cannot predict perfectly its revenue in its
own currency. This situation causes ex-ante uncertainty regarding the firm’s ability
to fully repay the lender after the exchange rate is realized. Additionally, firms are
also assumed to face domestic risk, resulting in smaller firms being more likely to not
repay their loan.
A key difference between this model and the model introduced in Manova (2013)
is that in the former the riskiness of the firm, from the lender’s perspective, depends on
the firm’s own behavior. By choosing how much to export, a firm chooses its exposure
to exchange rate risk, which affects the risk premium charged by the lender. The firm
internalizes this reaction by the lender and adjusts its optimal decision accordingly.
In times of high uncertainty, a firm reduces its exports in order to pay lower interest
rates. How much it does so however depends on its own financial constraints. This
is the mechanism which creates heterogeneity in firms’ reactions to varying levels of
exchange rate uncertainty.
2.2.1 Consumers
Consumers in country i have Cobb-Douglas preferences over goods in S sectors,
each identified by the letter s:
Ui =
∏
s
Cθsis , (2.1)
where θs is the fraction of country i’s households’ income spent on goods from sector
s. Within each sector, consumers in country i have constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) preferences over Ωis varieties, each identified by ω:
Cis =
[∫
ω∈Ωis
qis(ω)
αdω
]1/α
, (2.2)
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where  = 1
1−α > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties in a
given sector. The resulting demand for variety ω of sector s in country i is given by
qis(ω) = pis(ω)
− θsYi
P 1−is
, (2.3)
where Yi is total income in country i and the optimal consumer price index for sector
s in country i, Pis, satisfies
Pis =
[∫
ω∈Ωis
pis(ω)
1−dω
] 1
1−
. (2.4)
Of all varieties ω in sector s, some are produced domestically (in country i) and
some are produced abroad. Consumers do not have specific preferences regarding the
country of origin of each variety.
2.2.2 Producers
Each period, potential firms in country j can pay a sector-specific fixed entry cost
fejs in order to be able to draw a productivity level 1/a from cumulative distribution
G(a). Production happens in a constant-returns-to-scale fashion, so that each unit of
good costs acjs to produce for a firm operating in sector s, located in country j, and
with productivity level 1/a. Drawing a higher a implies a lower productivity level (a
higher variable cost). Departing from traditional heterogeneous-firm trade models, I
assume that a fraction of the variable cost represents expenditures on capital goods.27
The cost parameter cjs is a technical parameter determining relative cost levels across
countries and industries but independent from firm-specific technology a. There is
no additional fixed cost to serve the domestic market, so that all producing firms are
producing at least for their own market. The production for the domestic market is
27As emphasized below, these capital goods may be used as collateral.
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not modeled in this chapter.
2.2.3 Exporters
In order to be able to export to country i, a firm in country j must first pay a
fixed cost fijs, where fijs > 0 if i 6= j and fjjs = 0. In addition, an exporting firm
must pay a variable trade cost: in order for one unit of good to reach its destination,
the exporter must ship τij units, where τij ≥ 1 if i 6= j and τjj = 1. If it chooses to
export, the firm in country j signs an exporting contract with an importing firm in
country i. In this contract, quantity and price in the importing country’s currency
are fixed.
The exporting firm in country j with productivity level 1/a can decide of the terms
(price pijs(a) and quantity qijs(a)) of the contract, based on its profit-maximization
problem (described below). The firm maximizes its expected profit subject to the
demand function coming from country i, subject to its own financial constraint, and
given its expectation of what the exchange rate will be at the time of payment by the
customer.
The importing customer in country i pays country j’s producing firm in country
i’s currency only after it receives the shipment. The producing firm can use revenues
from domestic sales to internally finance the variable cost of producing the exported
good as well as a portion 1 − ds of the fixed cost of exporting. It must borrow the
remaining portion ds from a lender. The parameter ds therefore captures the firm’s
degree of external finance dependence. After it has been paid by its customer, the
exporting firm in country j uses the revenue to repay the lender. The timing of the
exporting firm’s operations can be summarized as follows. In period t, it finds a cus-
tomer in country i, agrees on a price (in country i’s currency) and quantity with this
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customer, and produces and ships the required quantity of goods. In period t+1, the
exchange rate is realized, the customer receives the shipment and pays the exporting
firm, and the exporting firm repays its lender.28
I assume that exporting firms are also subject to additional risk on the domestic
market, and that this risk is decreasing in a firm’s productivity level.29 It is modeled
as a probability λ(a) that the firm is unable to repay anything to its lender, with
λ′(a) > 0. This assumption captures the fact that small firms have been found to be
more financially constrained even when controlling for observable variables. In effect,
this assumption results in smaller firms facing higher interest rates.30
The exchange rate process The exchange rate Xt, defined in terms of the ex-
porting country’s currency per unit of the importing country’s currency, is assumed
to evolve according to
Xt+1 = Xtεt+1, (2.5)
where εt+1 follows a triangular distribution with a median of 1, a lower bound of
1 − ιt+1 and an upper bound of 1 + ιt+1, and where 0 < ιt+1 < 1.31 At time t,
Xt+1 is unknown but ιt+1, which captures the degree of time-varying exchange rate
uncertainty, is known. This implies that EtXt+1 = Xt so that higher uncertainty does
not affect the agents’ expectations of the future level of exchange rate.
28Whether the gap between periods t and t+1 is due to the time required for the goods to physically
travel or to the delayed payment by the importing firm does not affect the model’s predictions. The
key requirement is that at the time of production, the exchange rate that will determine the exporting
firm’s revenue in its own currency has not been realized and remains unknown.
29As explained below, in this type of model, less productive firms also turn out to be smaller firms.
30See, for example, Beck et al. (2008) for evidence that small firms are more financially constrained.
Section 2.3.4 provides evidence that small Canadian firms obtain higher interest rates on average.
31Choosing a different symmetric distribution such as a normal distribution would not alter the
qualitative predictions of the model. The triangular distribution is chosen for its simplicity: it
greatly simplifies the model’s analytical outcomes and significantly shortens the time required to
solve the model.
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The borrowing contract The contract between the exporting firm and its lender
is as follows. The firm borrows a portion ds of the fixed cost of exporting, the amount
of the loan is therefore dsfijs. After it has been paid by its foreign partner in for-
eign currency, the firm converts its revenue into its own domestic currency. If the
converted revenue is high enough, the firm repays its loan with gross interest rate
1 + Rijs(a). If the firm cannot repay its loan fully in cash, the lender can seize a
fraction ts ∈ (0, 1) of the firm’s capital and immediately resell it. I assume that the
firm’s stock of capital is the sum of the fixed cost it has to pay in order to operate,
fejs, and a fraction 1/b of the variable cost of producing the exported good, where
b > 1. The lender can only seize capital up to the amount it is owed.
The lending market is perfectly competitive and lenders are risk neutral. The
firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a lender for a loan of amount dsfijs with
gross interest rate 1 + Rijs(a). When the lender agrees to the loan, the current ex-
change rate is known by all, but the future exchange rate Xt+1, that will determine
the firm’s ability to repay its loan, is unknown. The lender can receive three dif-
ferent types of repayment. First, if the firm’s profit turns out to be high enough
and/or if the firm has enough tangible capital, the lender receives full repayment:
(1 + Rijs(a))dsfijs. Second, if the firm’s profit is not high enough and the firm’s
capital is not tangible enough, the lender receives partial repayment of the amount
{Xt+1pijs(a)qijs(a) − acjsτijqijs(a) − (1 − ds)fijs} + tsfejs + ts cjsτijb qijs(a), where the
term in curly brackets represents the firm’s profit and the last two terms represent
the firm’s capital being seized. Finally, with probability λ(a), the lender receives no
repayment.
The conditional probability (from the perspective of period t) that the lender
receives full repayment, denoted by λf , is given by the conditional probability that
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the sum of the firm’s profit and tangible capital is higher or equal to the repayment
amount agreed upon in the loan contract:
λf ≡ Conditional probability that the lender receives full repayment
= Probt
(
Xt+1pijs(a)qijs(a)− acjsτijqijs(a)− (1− ds)fijs + tsfejs + ts cjsτij
b
qijs(a)
≥ (1 +Rijs(a))dsfijs
)
= 1− F (A1),
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the symmetric triangular distri-
bution described above and where
A1 ≡ [(1+Rijs(a))ds+(1−ds)] fijs
Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)
+
(
1− ts
ab
)
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
− tsfejs
Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)
.32
In the case where εt+1 is low enough that the lender is not fully repaid (that is,
in the case where εt+1 < A1), the lender receives all of the firm’s profit and all of its
tangible capital. In this case, the lender expects to receive
Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)
∫ A1
1−ι
f(εt+1)εt+1dεt+1
− F (A1)
[
acjsτijqijs(a) + (1− ds)fijs − tsfejs − ts cjsτij
b
qijs(a)
]
,
where f(·) is the probability density function of the symmetric triangular distribution.
The lender is risk neutral, and the gross return on its outside option (the risk-free
32The symmetric triangular distribution with median 1, lower bound 1− ι, and upper bound 1 + ι
has the probability density function f(x) = (x−(1−ι))ι2 for 1− ι ≤ x < 1, the cumulative distribution
function F (x) = (x−(1−ι))
2
2ι2 for 1− ι < x ≤ 1, a mean of 1, and a variance of ι
2
6 .
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rate) is defined as (1 + r). The lender’s participation constraint is therefore given by
(1 + r)dsfijs ≤ [1− λ(a)]×
[
[1− F (A1)](1 +Rijs(a))dsfijs
+Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)
∫ A1
1−ι
f(εt+1)εt+1dεt+1
− F (A1)
[
acjsτijqijs(a) + (1− ds)fijs − tsfejs − ts cjsτij
b
qijs(a)
] ]
.
The repayment that the lender expects to receive from the firm must be greater or
equal to the return it can obtain from its outside option.
The exporting firm’s optimization problem The firm chooses the selling price
pijs(a) of the good it produces by maximizing its expected profit, Etpiijs(a). The only
unknown variable for the firm (as for the lender) is the realization of the exchange
rate determined by εt+1. The firm’s profit-maximization problem of exporting can be
characterized as
max
pijs(a)
Etpiijs(a) = pijs(a)qijs(a)Et(Xt+1)−acjsτijqijs(a)−(1−ds)fijs−(1+Rijs(a))dsfijs
(2.6)
subject to
qijs(a) = pijs(a)
− θsYi
P 1−is
(2.7)
(1 + r)dsfijs ≤ [1− λ(a)]×
[
[1− F (A1)](1 +Rijs(a))dsfijs
+Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)
∫ A1
1−ι
f(εt+1)εt+1dεt+1
− F (A1)
[
acjsτijqijs(a) + (1− ds)fijs − tsfejs − ts cjsτij
b
qijs(a)
] ]
.
(2.8)
The firm maximizes its expected profit subject to the demand function (con-
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straint (2.7)) and the lender’s participation constraint (constraint (2.8)). From the
firm’s perspective, the loan is always fully repaid because of the presence of collat-
eral. The firm reckons that if its profit is insufficient to fully repay, at least a fraction
of its capital will be seized to cover the difference. From the lender’s perspective,
however, capital is costly to recover and resell (ts < 1): even if it seizes all of a firm’s
capital, the payoff to the lender may be less than the amount it was due.33 The two
constraints always bind. The first constraint states that the firm always chooses to
sell the full quantity demanded for a given price and can be directly substituted into
the problem. The second constraint determines the lowest possible interest rate the
firm can obtain from a lender as a function of the price it chooses. Since the lending
market is perfectly competitive, this constraint also always binds. The firm optimizes
by choosing the price level that yields the highest expected profit. If the firm’s re-
sulting maximum expected profit from exporting, Etpiijs(a), is positive, it selects into
exporting. If it is negative, the firm chooses not to borrow and not to produce for
the foreign market.
2.3 Implications of the model
If a firm’s interest rate were independent of its chosen price, the firm would choose
its expected-profit-maximizing price such that
Xtpijs(a) =

− 1acjsτij.
Being in a monopolistically competitive market, the firm would choose a price (ex-
pressed in the firm’s domestic currency) that is a constant markup 
−1 over its
marginal cost of production. However, in this model, the interest rate that the firm
33The firm’s optimization problem reflects that capital is worth more for the firm than for the
lender. Explicitly modeling two different valuations of the same capital stock yields the same mech-
anism but makes the model significantly less tractable.
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faces is affected by its chosen price. The firm’s optimal price condition is therefore
given by
Xtpijs(a) =

− 1acjsτij −
1
− 1dsfijspijs(a)
1+P
1−
is
θsYi
∂(1 +Rijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
, (2.9)
where ∂(1+Rijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
reflects the effect of the firm’s chosen price on the interest rate it
can obtain, all else equal. This condition simplifies to
Xtpijs(a) =

− 1acjsτij
{ (
1− tsab
)
F (A1)
1− ∫ A11−ι f(εt+1)[1− εt+1]dεt+1
}
. (2.10)
Hence, the firm’s marginal cost is composed not only of a production cost, but also of
a financial cost. The latter is captured by the term in curly brackets in equation (2.10).
For a given price chosen by a firm, a lender chooses an optimal interest rate. Since
the lending market is perfectly competitive, the lender always chooses the lowest pos-
sible interest rate while satisfying its own participation constraint. All else equal, a
firm’s chosen price has several counteracting effects on the interest rate. First, for a
given probability of the firm defaulting, a higher price charged by the firm results in
a lower revenue for the firm, which results in a lower revenue to seize for the lender in
case of default and puts upward pressure on the interest rate. Second, depending on
the firm’s cost structure and on the level of exchange risk, a higher price can result in
a higher or lower probability of default for the firm. A higher probability of default
results in the lender asking for a higher interest rate and vice versa.
In what follows, I assume that the model’s parameters and variables are such
that the price chosen by any given firm is higher than it would be in the absence of
financial constraints (see equation (2.9)).34 This assumption reproduces the empirical
34Only firms that are effectively financially constrained choose a higher price. In the model
simulations below, some larger firms are in effect financially unconstrained, for example because
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fact that financial constraints hurt international trade and implies that a higher price
chosen by the firm results in a lower interest rate.35
The solution to the firm’s optimization problem is given by the price-interest-rate
pair that simultaneously solves equations (2.8) and (2.10).36 As in other heterogeneous-
firm models, more productive firms choose lower prices and export greater quantities,
and all firms with a productivity level equal to or higher than a sector-country-pair-
specific threshold (1/a∗ijs) select into exporting.
Proposition 1. For any given sector s and country pair ij, (i) more productive firms
charge lower prices and export greater quantities; and (ii) there exists a productivity
threshold 1/a∗ijs such that every firm with a > a∗ijs chooses not to export and every
firm with a ≤ a∗ijs chooses to export.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.1 The effect of financial constraints
A firm’s level of asset tangibility affects its lender’s return in case of incomplete
repayment and hence affects the interest rate it faces. A firm with highly tangible
assets has access to a lower interest rate and hence chooses a lower price (and a
greater quantity to export). A firm’s level of external finance dependence affects its
marginal cost mostly because it modifies the portion of cost on which interest must
be paid, but also because it affects the interest rate the firm must pay. For a given
chosen price, a higher ds results in a higher probability of default, but also in a higher
potential return for the lender since the loan amount is larger. Hence, a higher degree
they have enough collateral to guarantee their full loans. These firms are assumed to behave as
unconstrained firms would.
35See, for example, Manova (2013).
36The firm’s problem does not have a closed-form solution.
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of external finance dependence can either increase or decrease the interest rate paid
by the firm. In either case it results in a higher optimal price chosen by the firm, since
interest is paid on a larger amount, and a smaller quantity of goods being exported.
Proposition 2. Everything else equal, a firm with either (i) a higher degree of as-
set tangibility; or (ii) a lower degree of external finance dependence exports a larger
quantity.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.2 The effect of exchange rate uncertainty
The empirical analysis presented in the first chapter of this dissertation suggests
that exchange rate uncertainty affects exporting behavior differently in the presence
of different types of financial frictions. On the one hand, higher tangibility helps to
mitigate the negative effect of uncertainty, especially in sectors composed of mostly
large exporters. A higher degree of external finance dependence, on the other hand,
worsens the effect of uncertainty in sectors with a relatively high share of SMEs. In
this subsection, I describe the model’s mechanisms that can explain these empirical
features. It should be noted that the model can only explain a (weakly) negative
effect of exchange rate uncertainty on exports.
An increase in exchange rate uncertainty affects the exporting firm only through
its financial constraints and the interest rate it pays. A higher degree of uncer-
tainty increases the probability that the firm defaults on its loan, which makes the
risk-neutral lender demand a higher interest rate. As a result, the exporting firm
increases its price in order to limit the increase in interest rate, and exports decrease.
Proposition 3. Everything else equal, a higher degree of exchange rate uncertainty
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results in lower exports.
Proof. See Appendix.
A firm’s reaction to an increase in exchange rate uncertainty strongly depends
on its financial constraints. As mentioned above, higher tangibility results in a lower
interest rate since it reduces the likelihood that the lender receives less than it is due.
Tangibility however matters differently for firms with different levels of production
and, hence, for firms of different sizes. Figure 2.1a shows the percentage change in a
firm’s optimal price in response to an increase in exchange rate uncertainty for two
different levels of asset tangibility and different levels of productivity.37 An increase
in uncertainty results in an increase in the optimal price, and hence in a decrease in
the quantity exported for all types of firms. Highly productive (large) firms make
high profits and are therefore very safe for lenders regardless of their degree of asset
tangibility. They are relatively less negatively affected by exchange rate uncertainty.
Asset tangibility benefits firms of all sizes. On the one hand, since smaller firms are
riskier, their interest rates increase more with uncertainty. More tangible assets work
to limit this increase. On the other hand, larger firms own more capital (since they
have higher total variable costs), which makes a given degree of tangibility more valu-
able to them. Whether having higher asset tangibility benefits more smaller or larger
firms is indeterminate in this model and depends on parameter values. The calibra-
tion strategy described below reflects the fact that asset tangibility offers greater help
to larger firms in mitigating the negative effect of uncertainty more, as was found in
the empirical analysis, even if it did not directly target this fact.
Figure 2.1b shows the percentage change in a firm’s optimal price in response to
an increase in exchange rate uncertainty for two different levels of external finance
37The figures in this section are obtained by simulating the model for a baseline calibration. This
baseline calibration is for an average sector and an average time period as detailed in Section 2.4
below.
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dependence. Again, an increase in uncertainty results in an increase in the optimal
price, and hence in a decrease of quantity exported for firms will all levels of pro-
ductivity and external dependence. However, for the less productive firms, higher
external finance dependence results in a more negative effect of exchange rate uncer-
tainty, that is, it results in a larger increase in the optimal price and hence in a larger
decrease in the quantity exported. This effect comes from the fact that for smaller,
less productive firms, the risk of default is higher. An increase in exchange rate risk
therefore increases these firms’ probability of default even more, which results in their
lenders’ requiring even higher interest rates. Since external finance dependence has
several counteracting effects on financial frictions faced by firms, the net effect re-
mains small overall.
Extensive margin The model predicts that an increase in exchange rate uncer-
tainty does not only reduce the quantity of goods exported by each firm, but also re-
duces the number of firms selecting into exporting and hence the number of varieties
being exported in a given industry. As described above, an increase in uncertainty
leads to higher interest rates and higher optimal prices. For a firm, a higher interest
rate results in higher costs, while a higher optimal price results in lower revenues
(since the elasticity  > 1). Hence, the firm’s profit is lower. Given the fixed costs,
this outcome reduces the a∗ijs threshold below which firms select into exporting. Since
firms with more tangible capital represent less risk for lenders, their interest rates in-
crease less and they are less affected by exchange rate uncertainty. The productivity
threshold in sectors with more tangible capital is therefore less affected by uncer-
tainty, as illustrated by Figure 2.2a.
As described above, firms with high external finance dependence reduce their
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exports by greater percentages in times of high uncertainty, especially smaller, less
productive firms closer to the productivity threshold. The reason these firms subject
their price to greater increases is that they wish to limit the increase in the interest
rate they face, since it applies to a larger portion of their cost. As a result, an increase
in exchange rate uncertainty decreases the productivity threshold equally regardless
of the degree of external finance dependence, as illustrated by Figure 2.2b. Indeed,
while a firm with a higher external finance dependence does increase its price by more
in times of high uncertainty, thereby decreasing to a greater extent the quantity it
exports, it also faces a smaller increase in interest rate. The combination of the larger
increase in price (hence larger decrease in revenue) and lower increase in cost leads
to an approximately equal decrease in profit and consequently to an approximately
equal decrease in the productivity threshold a∗ijs.38
Proposition 4. Everything else equal, a higher degree of exchange rate uncertainty
results in a lower threshold a∗ijs below which firms select into exporting.
Proof. See Appendix.
This model is therefore able to predict a behavior of exporting firms in response
to exchange rate uncertainty and in the presence of financial constraints that is con-
sistent with the sectoral evidence identified in the first chapter of this dissertation. In
the absence of a closed-form solution, the model’s predictions cannot be easily aggre-
gated to the sector level. In Section 2.4, I calibrate the model and obtain sector-level
predictions through simulations. I then demonstrate that the firm-level mechanisms
of the model are sufficient to explain the sector-level empirical evidence of the first
chapter.
38Although not visible on the graph, the decrease is slightly larger for a higher level of external
finance dependence.
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2.3.3 Alternative assumptions
In this subsection, I modify some of the assumptions made in the baseline model
and study their effect on the model’s predictions and ability to reproduce the empirical
results described in the first chapter of this dissertation.
Financial (un)constraints If a firm is able to finance all of its production costs
internally (that is, ds = 0), its optimal pricing condition is given by
Xtpijs(a) =

− 1acjsτij. (2.11)
The optimal price is a fixed markup 
−1 over marginal production cost, corrected for
the expected exchange rate. Because of the presence of uncertainty, the firm’s opti-
mality condition is to set expected marginal revenue equal to a constant markup over
the (perfectly known) marginal cost of production. The expected marginal revenue
is given by Et(Xt+1)pijs(a) = Xtpijs(a). If changes in exchange rate uncertainty are
mean-preserving, exchange rate uncertainty has no effect on the firm’s optimal price
or on its expected profit or the (inverse) productivity threshold a∗ below which firms
choose to export.
Therefore, if firms are assumed to be risk neutral, the financial constraint as-
sumption is necessary for the model to be able to predict that exchange rate risk has
a negative effect on exports. This finding is analogous to earlier theories, such as
in Ethier (1973), predicting that financially unconstrained firms are affected by risk
only because of their risk-averse behavior. The case of risk-averse firms is analyzed
below.
59
Risk aversion To gain intuition, it is useful to evaluate the effect of risk aversion
on firms’ behavior by first assuming that firms can internally finance all of their costs
(ds = 0). If a firm has mean-variance preferences, it solves the following maximization
problem:
max
pijs(a)
Vt = Etpiijs(a)− %
2
vart(piijs(a)) (2.12)
where
Etpiijs(a) = pijs(a)qijs(a)Xt − acjsτijqijs(a)− cjsfij
vart(piijs(a)) = [Xtpijs(a)qijs(a)]
2 vart(εt+1),
and subject to
qijs(a) = pijs(a)
− θsYi
P 1−is
,
where vart(·) denotes the variance operator conditional on information known at time
t and % denotes the firm’s degree of risk aversion. In this case, the firm’s optimal-
pricing condition is given by
pijs(a) =

− 1
acjsτij
Xt
[
1− %pijs(a)1− θsYi
P 1−is
Xt
ι2
6
]−1
(2.13)
and the productivity threshold below which firms choose to export is given by 39
a∗ =
− 1
− 2
Xtpijs(a)
cjsτij
− 2− 1
− 2
fij
τijpijs(a)−
P 1−is
θsYi
. (2.14)
These conditions imply that the optimal price is increasing both in the degree of risk
aversion and in the level of exchange rate uncertainty. Intuitively, higher risk aversion
decreases the firm’s expected risk-corrected profit Vt but only to the extent that its
39In this case, I assume that firms choose to export as long as their utility Etpiijs(a)− %2vart(piijs(a))
is greater or equal to zero. If % = 0, the optimal-price condition simplifies to equation (2.11).
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profit is uncertain. Since the exchange rate risk only applies to its revenue, the firm
can only reduce the variance of its profits by decreasing the variance of its revenue.
It does so by decreasing its revenue altogether, via an increase in price. The intuition
is similar for the effect of exchange rate uncertainty. The firm reacts to an increase
in risk by decreasing the exposure of its revenue to this risk: it increases its price,
which decreases the quantity it exports.
Whether an increase in risk aversion or in exchange rate risk leads to a decrease
in the productivity threshold a∗ depends on whether the firm’s overall expected risk-
corrected profit decreases. By itself, an increase in risk aversion decreases Vt. How-
ever, it also prompts the firm to increase its price, which decreases its expected profit
but also decreases the conditional variance of its profit. The overall effect on the
firm’s Vt (and on the productivity threshold a∗) therefore depends on the relative
strength of these three effects. An increase in exchange rate risk generates the same
three effects.
If a firm is risk averse and financially constrained (ds > 0), the lender is not
directly affected by the firm’s degree of risk aversion. Hence, for a given price chosen
by the firm, the lender demands the same interest rate as in the case where % = 0. A
positive degree of risk aversion however does affect the firm’s pricing decision.40 More
risk-averse firms charge higher prices, which decreases their probability of default,
which in turn decreases the interest rate they can obtain. In fact, making firms risk
averse does not affect qualitatively how financial frictions affect the reaction of firms’
exporting behavior in response to varying levels of uncertainty. However, because
firms charge higher prices when they are risk averse, they reduce their own riskiness
40In this case, the firm’s optimal-pricing condition is given by
Xtpijs(a) =

−1acjsτij
1−(ts/a)F (A1)
1−F (A1)+
∫A1
1−ι f(εt+1)εt+1dεt+1−[1−F (A1)]% ι
2
6 Xtpijs(a)
1− θsYi
P
1−
is
.
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and are in effect less financially constrained. The role of financial frictions in the
relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and exports is therefore dampened.
2.3.4 Empirical evidence supporting the model
The model introduced in this chapter relies on financial frictions to rationalize
the results obtained in the first chapter of this dissertation: when exchange rate un-
certainty increases, exporting firms are more likely to default on their loans and as a
result their lenders require higher interest rates. The model also predicts that firms
with higher asset tangibility are able to obtain lower interest rates, but makes no such
clear predictions for the degree of external finance dependence. Finally, the model
predicts that lenders demand higher interest rates in times of higher uncertainty. In
this section, I provide evidence supporting the model’s financial mechanisms by using
syndicated loan data for Canadian firms.
In order to validate the mechanisms of the model, I test how the interest rates
that Canadian firms obtain from banks depend on the different measures of financial
constraints and risk. I use the WRDS-Thomson-Reuters’ LPC DealScan dataset cov-
ering syndicated lending in the world. The database contains credit deals (“facilities”)
obtained by firms from a syndicate of lenders, including information on the borrower,
the lender(s) and the deal itself (interest rate, maturity, etc.).41 For all regressions
described and presented in this section, the dependent variable is the facility spread,
which is the premium (including fees) over the risk-free rate (typically the LIBOR or
prime rates).42
41I keep only the facilities in which the borrower (and the borrower’s “ultimate parent”) is based
in Canada and does not operate in the finance, insurance, real estate, or public administration
industries (SIC codes in the 6000 and 9000). I also keep only the facilities that are either term loans
or credit lines. Finally, I keep only the facilities whose type is described as a “Term Loan”, “364-Day
Facility”, “Demand Loan”, “Limited Line”, or “Revolver”.
42It should be noted that the results presented in this section should be compared to the empirical
results about exports only with great care. Syndicated loans or credit lines are available for high
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In a first regression, I test for the effect of firm and facility characteristics on the
interest rate. In terms of firm characteristics, I include tangibility of assets, exter-
nal finance dependence and profitability (defined as gross profits over sales). In the
absence of detailed information about firms in the DealScan database, I construct
these variables at the NAICS-3 industry level from U.S. firms using the Compustat
database. Additional controls include the amount of the facility, the maturity of
the facility, as well as dummies for term loans (as opposed to credit lines), public
firms, multiple lead arrangers, and currency of the facility. I also include province
fixed effects. The results are presented in column 1 of Table 2.1. I find that asset
tangibility and facility amount lead to a lower interest rate whereas facility maturity
and profitability lead to a higher interest rate.43 External finance dependence has a
positive but much less significant effect on average.44
In a second regression (column 2 of Table 2.1), I test for the effect of economic
uncertainty on the interest rate charged by banks. Since time fixed effects cannot be
included, I add U.S. GDP growth and Canadian GDP growth as additional controls
to capture macroeconomic events. I also add industry fixed effects. I find that both
exchange rate uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty (measured by the VIX in-
dex) have statistically significant positive effects on interest rates. This suggests that
banks do take macroeconomic risk into account when making decisions about interest
rates allocated to specific firms for specific loans or credit lines. This further suggests
amounts, which are more likely to be needed by large firms. In my dataset, only two facilities are
under 150,000 USD and the average facility amount is above 300 million USD. These results may
therefore not reflect the average relationships between firms and their creditors.
43It is surprising to find that profitability results in a higher interest rate. One potential ex-
planation is that lenders may evaluate a firm’s profitability relative to profitability of other firms
in the same industry. In that case, the sectoral-level measure of profitability would capture other
unobserved sectoral characteristics.
44It should be noted that the coefficients on the external finance dependence variable in these
regressions have to be interpreted differently from the model’s implications since here the debt
amount is known and explicitly controlled for.
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that firms do not completely hedge their exposure to these risks and that their level
of risk aversion is not high enough to completely eliminate the risk for their lenders.
Even though no disaggregated data covering non-syndicated credit are publicly
available, Statistics Canada publishes aggregated data from surveys sent to Canadian
SMEs. The responses to the Survey on Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises
for the years 2000, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014 show that among SMEs it is harder
for smaller firms to obtain credit (a smaller share of their requested credit is likely to
be accepted) and that they obtain less favorable interest rates. The latter tends to
be true both for the total credit obtained and within each debt category.45 A subset
of the surveys’ aggregated responses are presented in the Appendix.
2.4 Calibration and simulated regressions
In this section, I describe the strategy used to calibrate the model. Most param-
eters are obtained directly from data or from the existing literature. The remainder
are calibrated by matching sector-level moments to their data counterparts. In the
absence of a closed-form solution, the model must be simulated to obtain sector-level
predictions. I then simulate the calibrated model using the true processes of variables
over the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period and aggregate the resulting exports at the sector
level. Lastly, I run the regressions of the empirical analysis (presented in the first
chapter of this dissertation) on the simulated data and demonstrate that the model
is able to replicate the results.
45The available data does not allow to uncover the reasons behind these results, i.e. whether
smaller firms tend to be less profitable, have less tangible assets, etc.
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2.4.1 Calibration
The model contains 14 parameters to be calibrated when the processes of the
variables Yi, Pis, Xt, 1 + r and ι are taken as given. The first four parameters are
obtained from data. The construction of external finance dependence ds and asset
tangibility ts is described in the empirical analysis in the first chapter of this dis-
sertation. External finance dependence is rescaled to take only values between 0.2
and 0.8.46 Additionally, the parameter b, which captures the share of variable cost
composed of physical capital, is set to 4.47 Parameter θs, which measures the fraction
of U.S. income spent on goods and services from sector s, is obtained by calculating
the ratio U.S. domestic consumption of goods and services from sector sU.S. GDP where the numerator is equal
to the sum of U.S. production and net imports (imports minus exports) in sector s.
All variables are in nominal terms. The measure is calculated quarterly over the
2002Q1-2015Q4 period for each sector. Since the ratio does not vary much over time,
the parameter θs is assumed to be constant and equal to the average between 2002Q1
and 2015Q4.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties, , is set to 3.8 following Bernard
et al. (2003). To obtain this value, the authors match the size advantage of U.S.
exporting firms: a high elasticity results in higher sensitivity to price on that part of
consumers, benefiting larger, more productive firms able to charge lower prices. The
iceberg trade cost τij is set to 1.2, following the existing literature. The parameter
λ(a) measures the probability that a firm with productivity parameter 1/a does not
repay its loan and that the lender is unable to recover any collateral. It is assumed
46In the model, ds captures a share of the export cost and must hence be between 0 and 1. A
slightly smaller range is chosen since extreme values of ds result in extreme model predictions.
47Measures of asset tangibility and physical capital intensity of the production process reported
in Manova (2013) and estimated from U.S. firm-level data by Braun (2003) show that the latter is
highly correlated with the former, but on average four times smaller. I therefore use the fraction ts4
to capture the share of variable costs that can be attributed to physical capital, i.e. that is fit for
being posted as collateral.
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to be increasing in parameter a, or decreasing with the firm’s level of productivity:
smaller, less productive firms are more likely to go bankrupt. λ(a) is assumed to take
the functional form λ(a) = 0.1
(
a
a∗ijs
)4
. In each sector, the least productive exporting
firm (for which a = a∗ijs) has a 10-percent probability of bankruptcy.48 Parameter
fejs measures the fixed cost of producing (or existing) for a firm in sector s. It re-
flects part of the physical capital that the firm can use as collateral to obtain outside
financing. While the firm’s existence decision is not modeled in this chapter, several
papers attempt to measure the relative sizes of fijs and fejs. I follow Impullitti et al.
(2013) and assume that fijs = 1.43fejs. Assuming a constant ratio between fijs and
fejs also ensures that the effects of ts (multiplying fejs) and ds (multiplying fijs) can
be distinguished from the effects of the fixed cost parameters.
In order to make predictions at the sector level, firm-level predictions must be
aggregated. For example, a random potential exporter in sector s is expected to ex-
port
∫ aH
aL
qijs(a)dG(a), where G(a) is the cumulative distribution function from which
the firm’s productivity parameter a is drawn, and aL and aH are the lower and up-
per bounds of the support of this distribution, respectively. Total exports in sector
s are given by EXijs(a) ≡
∫ aH
aL
qijs(a)dG(a) · nexporters, where nexporters is the total
number of potential exporters.49 Hence, parameters aL, aH and nexporters, as well
as any parameter governing the shape of distribution G(a), must be calibrated to
obtain sectoral predictions and appropriately evaluate the model’s ability to explain
the empirical evidence detailed in the first chapter. aL and aH are normalized to 1
and 10, respectively. The number of potential exporters nexporters is set to 10,000.
In comparison, data from Statistics Canada indicates that the number of existing
firms (not necessarily exporting) in any given manufacturing sector between 2011
48In comparison, data from Statistics Canada suggest that in a given quarter, about 2.5 percent
of Canadian manufacturing firms declare bankruptcy.
49The term “potential exporters” is used since it is generally not profitable for all firms to export.
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and 2015 was between 198 and 8,089.50 Following the existing literature, I assume
that the parameter 1/a follows a bounded Pareto distribution defined over [aL,aH ]
with sector-specific shape parameter ks, so that G(a) =
aks−aksL
aksH −aksL
.
Since the model does not have a closed-form solution, EXijs is obtained by sim-
ulating the model for a large number of productivity level a and discretely adding
the resulting firm-level exports qijs(a) weighted by their probability density function
g(a) = G′(a). The [aL,aH ] interval is divided into 1,000 sections. The model is simu-
lated for the values of a at the center of each of these sections and EXijs is computed
as
∑aH
aL
qijs(a)g(a).51
The three remaining sector-specific parameters - ks, cjs, and fijs - are calibrated
to simultaneously match three sector-specific moments obtained from data.52 The
first moment is average exports over the sample period. The second moment is the
share of exports coming from SMEs. This moment is strongly influenced by the pa-
rameter of the Pareto distribution: a higher ks results in a higher weight given to
smaller firms (firms with a larger technology parameter a). The third moment is the
number of exporting firms. In the model, this moment is given by G(a∗ijs) · nexporters
and strongly depends on the fixed cost of exporting fijs. In the data, this moment is
obtained from Statistics Canada. The number of exporters is available annually from
2010 and averaged over the 2010-2015 period.
For each potential calibration, the model is simulated for the average period in
the sample. The U.S. GDP (Yi), U.S. sector-level producer price index (Pis), CAD-
50The earliest year available is 2011.
51For values of a > a∗ijs, qijs(a) is set to zero since these firms do not select into exporting. If a∗ijs
turns out greater than aH , it is re-set to aH .
52The absence of closed-form solutions causes all simulated moments to depend on all variables
and parameters.
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USD exchange rate (Xt), and Canadian risk-free interest rate (1 + r) variables are set
to their average value. The remaining variable, exchange rate uncertainty, captured
by the parameter ι of the triangular distribution, is set to 0.4. This value is chosen
to ensure that the predicted interest rates faced by firms remain reasonable.53 Be-
cause the model aims to explain the negative effect of uncertainty on firms’ decision
to export, I consider only the 11 sectors which have been found in the first chapter
to react significantly negatively to uncertainty. The resulting sector-level parameters
are contained in Table 2.2.
2.4.2 Simulated Regressions
In order to verify that the model can reproduce the sector-level patterns un-
covered in the first chapter of this dissertation, I simulate data from the calibrated
model using the true processes of the four variables. The measure of exchange rate
uncertainty is rescaled to take only values between 0.2 and 0.8 and to have a mean of
0.4.54 I then run the main regressions on the simulated export series (total margin)
and on the simulated number of exporters series (extensive margin).55 Tables 2.3
and 2.4 contain the results for both actual and simulated data, and for both the
total and extensive margins regressions. The resulting coefficients are quantitatively
and qualitatively similar. Unsurprisingly, the mechanism is better identified with the
53The symmetric triangular distribution around 1 used to capture the exchange rate uncertainty
process can only take values of ι greater than zero and smaller than one. As described below, for
simulations, the measure of exchange rate uncertainty used in the empirical analysis is re-scaled
to take values between 0.2 and 0.8 only since the model behaves unrealistically when ι takes on
extreme values. Assuming, additionally, a mean value of 0.4 balances a trade-off between smaller
firms’ interest rates being unrealistically high and the mean value of ι being unrealistically close to
the lower bound of 0.2.
54The log of the resulting series is highly correlated with the log of the original series, with a
coefficient of correlation of 0.975. To be able to compare the coefficients’ magnitudes, the original
series is used in the regressions on simulated data.
55The variables Oil Pricet and Oil Price Uncertaintyt are excluded from the regressions on simu-
lated data since they are not part of the theoretical model. For the extensive margin regressions, I
aggregate the quarterly simulated number of exporters series to an annual series and keep only the
years for which the true data is available.
68
simulated data. This confirms that even though the model predicts only a very small
effect of external finance dependence on both export margins, it is sufficient to repro-
duce empirical results.56
The model introduced in this chapter is therefore able to explain the patterns of
international trade in response to exchange rate uncertainty identified earlier. Higher
exchange rate uncertainty results in lower exports, but this decrease is not homoge-
neous across sectors. Different types of financial frictions result in different sectors
being differently affected by exchange rate risk. Sectors in which firms have more tan-
gible capital are unambiguously less negatively affected by uncertainty both at the
intensive and extensive margins. Larger firms, producing larger volumes and owning
more capital, benefit even more for having highly tangible assets. Sectors in which
firms rely more on external finance are more negatively affected by uncertainty. Since
less productive firms are riskier, they are even more negatively affected. Hence, exter-
nal finance dependence results in a larger decrease in exports in sectors with relatively
more small firms. This result comes from the intensive margin of trade (exports of a
given variety of good) rather than the extensive margin of trade (number of varieties
of goods exported). External finance dependence does not have a significant effect on
how much the number of varieties of goods exported is affected by exchange rate un-
certainty. These predictions of the model fit with the empirical features documented
in the empirical analysis presented in the first chapter of this dissertation.
2.5 Counterfactual analysis
In this section, I use the calibrated model to answer additional questions about
the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the behavior of exporting firms. I first
56One caveat of the model however is that it overestimates the total effect of exchange rate
uncertainty on exports, even when considering only the sectors negatively impacted.
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estimate the amount that different types of firms would be willing to pay in order to
avoid uncertainty or, equivalently, the reduction in their profit that is attributable
to this type of risk. Second, I examine how policymakers can mitigate the costs of
exchange rate uncertainty. In the model, risk affects exports because of the presence
of financial frictions. Alleviating these frictions therefore results in a smaller effect of
risk. As an experiment, I increase the tangibility of firms’ capital by 50 percent. In
effect, this reproduces a policy (implemented, for example, by Export Development
Canada) of providing additional collateral to financially-constrained exporters. The
goal of this type of policy is to reduce exporters’ borrowing costs or increase their
borrowing limit, and allow them to export more.
2.5.1 The willingness to pay to avoid uncertainty
In theory, exporting firms that are negatively affected by exchange rate uncer-
tainty should be willing to pay in order to reduce this uncertainty, for example by
hedging their exposure to the exchange rate. In this counterfactual exercise, I use
the calibrated model to quantitatively assess how much firms would be willing to pay.
I estimate the profit loss due to the presence of uncertainty for different hypotheti-
cal firms for each of the 11 sectors found to be negatively affected by exchange rate
uncertainty. For each hypothetical firm, I calculate the difference in profit between
two situations: 1- all variables, including exchange rate uncertainty, are set to their
average value over the sample period, and 2- all variables are set to their average
value except exchange rate uncertainty, which is set to zero. Columns 1, 2, and 3 of
Table 2.5 contain the estimated difference in profit for firms at the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the sector-specific [aL, a∗ijs] spectrum, respectively. The results
show that the difference in profit is slightly lower for firms of medium size, that it
is the highest for larger firms, and that it is generally between 200,000 and 400,000
CAD per firm per quarter. These results follow directly from the model’s implica-
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tions. On the one hand, large firms increase their price by less than other firms in
the presence of uncertainty, but these prices apply to large quantities. This results in
the largest decreases in profit in absolute terms and hence to the largest willingness
to pay to avoid uncertainty. On the other hand, smaller firms sell small quantities
but decrease their price by more, resulting also in large profit losses. Consequently,
firms of medium size have the smallest profit losses and the smallest willingness to pay.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 2.5 express these different willingness to pay in
terms of the share of the firms’ profit that they represent. The calibrated model
predicts that relatively large firms would be willing to pay less than one percent of
their profits to completely avoid exchange rate uncertainty. Medium firms would be
willing to pay around two percent, and smaller firms, around eight percent. The
fact that profit differences are relatively small compared to firms’ simulated profits
offers some potential answers regarding why many firms choose to ignore exchange
rate uncertainty risk. One such potential answer is that the profit differences are too
small for managers to take notice, even if they are economically significant. A second
potential answer is that the (perceived) cost of hedging exchange rate exposure is
higher than the firms’ willingness to pay. In this case, estimates in columns 1-3 of
Table 2.5 provide lower bounds on firms’ (perceived) cost of hedging.
2.5.2 A policy experiment
In a last exercise, I estimate by how much firms’ profit losses and export reduc-
tions due to exchange rate uncertainty can be alleviated by relaxing their financial
constraints. For each sector, I increase the tangibility parameter ts by 50 percent to
simulate a hypothetical economic policy of providing collateral to exporting firms.
Results are displayed in Table 2.6. I find that profit losses can be reduced on average
by 19 percent, with the greatest gains for larger firms. I also find that increased
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tangibility leads on average to a decline of 13 percent in the decrease in exports due
to uncertainty. Again, the largest firms make the highest relative gains.57 These
numbers suggest that providing additional collateral to firms is a sensible policy, but
that it must be applied very widely to have a large effect on exports. Furthermore,
this type of policy disproportionately benefits larger firms.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study theoretically how a specific type of uncertainty, exchange
rate uncertainty, affects firms’ exporting decisions. Building on progress made by the
recent literature, I focus on the role of financial frictions. I introduce a theoretical
model that provides mechanisms rationalizing the empirical findings described in the
first chapter of this dissertation. In the model, risk-neutral firms must borrow from
a lender to cover some of the costs of exporting. The lender charges an interest rate
above the risk-free rate because the repayment by the firm is only partially guaran-
teed by collateral. The uncertainty about the firm’s repayment arises from exchange
rate risk. The price agreed upon by the exporting firm and its foreign customer is set
in the customer’s currency. Hence, before the exchange rate is realized, the exporting
firm cannot precisely predict its revenue in its own currency, which causes ex-ante
uncertainty regarding its ability to fully repay its loan. Exports from firms with
different degrees of external finance dependence and asset tangibility are differently
affected by exchange rate uncertainty since they represent different potential levels of
risk for their lender.
The calibrated model reveals in a counterfactual analysis that the amount that
firms would be willing to pay in order to avoid exchange rate uncertainty is a relatively
57In the model, large firms benefit more from asset tangibility by construction because of their
larger capital stock.
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small fraction of their profits and that a policy of providing additional collateral to
exporters would have limited effects on smaller firms. The model therefore sheds
light on the effect of potential ways for policymakers to alleviate the negative effect
of uncertainty on trade.
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2.7 Figures
(a) Asset tangibility (b) External finance dependence
Figure 2.1: Change in price in response to an increase in exchange rate uncertainty
(a) Asset tangibility (b) External finance dependence
Figure 2.2: Change in productivity threshold in response to an increase in exchange
rate uncertainty
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2.8 Tables
Dependent variable (log) spread over risk-free rate
(basis points)
1 2
Asset Tang -0.0034***
(-4.82)
Ext Fin Dep 0.00010*
(1.67)
Profitability 0.716***
(5.85)
log Exch Rate Uncertainty 0.282***
(7.10)
log VIX 0.170***
(3.22)
log Loan amount -0.242*** -0.141***
(-23.62) (-12.30)
log Loan maturity 0.125*** 0.115***
(5.60) (4.54)
Quarter × Year FE Yes No
Industry FE No Yes
Obs 2076 1879
R-squared 0.549 0.422
This table presents estimates obtained using data on syndicated
lending to Canadian firms for the 1988Q1-2015Q4 period. The
dependent variable is the (log) spread over the risk-free rate in
basis points. The control variables include the (log) loan amount,
the (log) loan maturity, as well as dummy variables for term loans,
public firms and the presence of multiple lenders. Province fixed
effects are also added. In the first column, sectoral measures of asset
tangibility, external finance dependence and profitability are added,
as well as quarter-year fixed effect. In the second regression, time
fixed effects are dropped and industry fixed effects are added, and
additional controls include the log of exchange rate uncertainty and
of the VIX index, as well as U.S. GDP growth and Canada GDP
growth. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.1: Determinants of interest rates for Canadian firms
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Param. 312 313 314 315 321 326 332 334 335 336 337
τij 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
b 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
θs (%) 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.37 0.55 0.78 0.24 1.39 0.17
ds 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.54 0.40 0.46 0.38 0.60 0.57 0.44 0.20
ts 0.22 0.33 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.34 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.25
cjs 237 120 173 204 203 259 259 275 245 381 180
fijs 0.0030 0.0033 0.0013 0.0014 0.0027 0.0023 0.0020 0.0048 0.0026 0.0078 0.0026
fejs
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
fijs
1.43
ks 6.0 11.3 9.7 8.0 4.8 5.3 6.9 5.8 5.5 2.8 6.8
Table 2.2: Calibrated parameters by sector
Dependent variable log Exports (2010 prices)
Actual data Simulated data
1 2
log Uncertt -0.360*** -0.637***
(-3.89) (-14.87)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0045*** 0.0063***
(4.10) (7.97)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs 0.0147*** 0.0255***
(3.37) (13.89)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0033** 0.0055***
(2.74) (9.83)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.00006*** -0.000086***
(-4.09) (-8.25)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.00015** -0.00037***
(2.64) (-15.90)
Sector FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Number obs 1232 1232
R-squared(within) 0.933 0.999
Column 1 reproduces the results from column 1 in Table 1.6. Column 2 contains the
results of the identical regression run on simulated data obtained from the calibrated
model. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.3: Regressions on simulated data - Total margin of trade
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Dependent variable log Number of varieties
Actual data Simulated data
1 2
log Uncertt -0.298** -0.332***
(-2.58) (-4.35)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps 0.0034* 0.0024**
(2.13) (2.70)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs 0.0126** 0.0097**
(2.42) (2.95)
log Uncertt × Share SMEs 0.0023 0.00057
(1.26) (0.52)
log Uncertt × Ext Fin Deps × Sh SMEs -0.000037 -0.000033**
(-1.65) (-2.71)
log Uncertt × Asset Tangs × Sh SMEs -0.00014 -0.00015**
(-1.64) (-2.98)
Sector FE Yes Yes
Quarter FE - -
Year FE No No
Number obs 264 264
R-squared(within) 0.812 0.991
Column 1 contains the results of a regression identical to that of column 3 in Table
1.6. Column 2 contains the results of the identical regression run on simulated data
obtained from the calibrated model. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.4: Regressions on simulated data - Extensive margin of trade
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Million CAD Share of profits (%)
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6
312 Beverage and tobacco 0.41 0.27 0.32 0.86 2.11 8.37
313 Textile 0.47 0.27 0.30 0.69 1.73 6.97
314 Textile products 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.73 1.81 7.21
315 Clothing 0.32 0.16 0.17 1.00 2.17 8.36
321 Wood products 0.34 0.22 0.25 0.69 1.80 7.26
326 Plastics and rubber products 0.32 0.19 0.21 0.68 1.71 6.80
332 Fabricated metal products 0.39 0.19 0.20 0.81 1.85 7.24
334 Computer and electronic products 1.10 0.56 0.60 1.02 2.20 8.46
335 Electrical equipment 0.46 0.26 0.29 0.92 2.11 8.15
336 Transportation equipment 0.91 0.68 0.82 0.88 2.25 8.95
337 Furniture and related products 0.43 0.24 0.26 0.81 1.95 7.77
This table contains the profit loss arising from the presence of exchange rate uncertainty per firm
per quarter. In columns 1-3 I calculate the difference between a firm’s predicted profit in case of
average uncertainty and its predicted profit in case of no uncertainty. Columns 4-6 express these
losses as percentages of firms’ profits. A large firm is defined as a firm whose productivity parameter
a is on the 25th percentile of the sector-specific [aL,a∗ijs] spectrum. Medium and small firms are on
the 50th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
Table 2.5: Profit loss from uncertainty
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Reduction in Reduction in
profit loss (%) exports decrease (%)
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6
312 Beverage and tobacco 23.3 17.6 18.0 17.40 12.36 11.08
313 Textile 29.7 22.7 24.7 22.41 15.87 15.26
314 Textile products 27.2 20.7 22.6 20.41 14.45 13.82
315 Clothing 9.9 7.6 8.5 7.25 5.20 4.97
321 Wood products 31.4 23.7 25.1 23.76 16.71 15.62
326 Plastics and rubber products 30.8 23.4 25.5 23.27 16.42 15.76
332 Fabricated metal products 19.8 15.6 18.1 14.73 10.64 10.75
334 Computer and electronic products 9.2 7.1 7.9 6.78 4.86 4.60
335 Electrical equipment 16.8 12.8 13.6 12.47 8.87 8.20
336 Transportation equipment 25.4 19.2 19.2 19.04 13.61 11.96
337 Furniture and related products 22.0 17.0 18.8 16.39 11.73 11.33
This table contains the reduction in profit loss (columns 1-3) and export reduction (columns 4-6)
arising from the presence of exchange rate uncertainty per firm per quarter when asset tangibility
is increased by 50 percent. A large firm is defined as a firm whose productivity parameter a is on
the 25th percentile of the sector-specific [aL,a∗ijs] spectrum. Medium and small firms are on the
50th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
Table 2.6: Reduction in losses from increased tangibility
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2.9 Appendix A: Proofs
Note that these proofs assume that:
1. A1 < 1 since if, in expectation, the firm is expecting to default, it will not select
into exporting.
2. A1 > 1 − ι, that is, the realization of the exchange rate which would make a
firm to default is on the range of possible realizations of the exchange rate.
3. Xtpijs(a) > −1acjsτij, that is, the presence of financial frictions and exchange
rate uncertainty decreases exports compared to the frictionless case.
2.9.1 Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (i) The quantities part follows from demand: qijs(a) = pijs(a)− θsYiP 1−is
.
Need to show that ∂pijs(a)
∂a
> 0, taking into account the effect on the interest rate.
First note that the firm’s FOC can be expressed as
(1− ) + acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
=
[(1− ι)− A1]2
6ι2 − 3[(1− ι)− A1]2
[
(− 1)[(1− ι) + 2A1]− 3
(
1− ts
ab
)
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
]
.
Take the total differential with respect to pijs(a) and a, taking into account that A1
depends on both variables both directly and via the interest rate (1 + Rijs(a)), to
obtain
dpijs(a)
da
=
cjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
[6ι2−3(ts/ab)[A1−(1−ι)]2]
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2 − {·} ∂A1∂a
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)2
[6ι2−3(ts/ab)[A1−(1−ι)]2]
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2 + {·} ∂A1∂pijs(a)
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where
{·} ={
36ι2[A1 − (1− ι)]
[6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2]2
{
(− 1)A1 − (− 1)[A1 − (1− ι)]
3
6ι2
−
(
1− ts
ab
)
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
}}
,
∂A1
∂a
=
(
1− ts
ab
)
cjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
[
1 +Xtpijs(a)
1− θsYi
P 1−is
3[A1 − (1− ι)]2
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2
]
+
λ′(a)(1 + r)
[1− λ(a)]2
dsfijs6ι
2
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2 ,
and
∂A1
∂pijs(a)
={
(− 1)A1
pijs(a)
−
(
1− ts
ab
)
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)2
+
(− 1)
pijs(a)
[A1 − (1− ι)]3
6ι2
}
6ι2
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2 .
This term can be shown to be negative as long as (i) we are not in a situation where
risk is very low and probability of default is very high (unlikely to be delivered by
the model) and (ii) financial constraints are strong enough so that the optimal price
is sufficiently above the pure monopolistic competition markup over marginal cost
of production. This implies that {·} is also negative. ∂A1
∂a
is positive. As a result,
dpijs(a)
da
> 0.
Proposition 1 (ii) A firm chooses to export only if Etpiijs(a) > 0. Hence, it suffices
to show that Etpiijs(a) is strictly decreasing in a (since the fixed cost (1− ds)fijs does
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not depend on a).
∂Etpiijs(a)
∂a
=
∂Etpiijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
∂a
− cjsτijpijs(a)− θsYi
P 1−is
− dsfijs
[
∂(1 +Rijs(a))
∂a
]holding pijs(a) fixed
where ∂Etpiijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
= 0 by firm’s FOC and
[
∂(1 +Rijs(a))
∂a
]
holding pijs(a) fixed =(
1− ts
ab
)
cjsτijpijs(a)
− θsYi
P 1−is
3[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2
+ λ
′(a)(1+r)
[1−λ(a)]2 dsfijs
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2
dsfijs
> 0.
2.9.2 Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (i) To show that ∂pijs(a)
∂ts
< 0, take total differential of the firm’s
FOC with respect to pijs(a) and ts to obtain
dpijs(a)
dts
=
− 3[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2
cjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
− {·} ∂A1
∂ts
6ι2−3(ts/ab)[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)2
+ {·} ∂A1
∂pijs(a)
where {·} is as defined above and where, taking into account the effect of ts on
(1 +Rijs(a)), but holding pijs(a) fixed, one can obtain
∂A1
∂ts
=
−6ι2
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2
[
cjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
+
fejs
Xtpijs(a)1−
P 1−is
θsYi
]
< 0.
Proposition 2 (ii) To show that ∂pijs(a)
∂ds
> 0, take total differential of the firm’s
FOC with respect to pijs(a) and ds to obtain
dpijs(a)
dds
=
−{·} ∂A1
∂ds
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)2
6ι2−3(ts/ab)[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2 + {·} ∂A1∂pijs(a)
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where {·} is as defined above and where, taking into account the effect of ds on
(1 +Rijs(a)), but holding pijs(a) fixed, one can obtain
∂A1
∂ds
=
fijs
Xtpijs(a)1−
P 1−is
θsYi
6ι2
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2
{
(1 + r)
1− λ(a) − 1
}
> 0.
2.9.3 Proposition 3
To show that ∂pijs(a)
∂ι
> 0, take total differential of the firm’s FOC with respect
to pijs(a) and ι to obtain
dpijs(a)
dι
=
−{·} ∂A1
∂ι
+ (−1)[A1−(1−ι)]
2
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2 −
[
(1− ) + acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)
] [
12ι[ι−[A1−(1−ι)]]
[A1−(1−ι)][6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2]
]
acjsτij
Xtpijs(a)2
[
6ι2−3(ts/ab)[A1−(1−ι)]2
6ι2−3[A1−(1−ι)]2
]
+ {·} ∂A1
∂pijs(a)
where {·} is as defined above and where, taking into account the effect of ι on (1 +
Rijs(a)) but holding pijs(a) fixed, one can obtain
∂A1
∂ι
=
[A1 − (1− ι)]2
ι
3ι− 2[A1 − (1− ι)]
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2 > 0
since ι > A1 − (1− ι).
2.9.4 Proposition 4
It was already showed that Etpiijs(a) is strictly decreasing in a. Hence, to show
that a∗ijs is decreasing in ι, I only need to show that Etpiijs(a) is strictly decreasing in
ι for any given a.
∂Etpiijs(a)
∂ι
=
∂Etpiijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
∂ι
− dsfijs
[
∂(1 +Rijs(a))
∂ι
]holding pijs(a) fixed
< 0
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since ∂Etpiijs(a)
∂pijs(a)
= 0 by the firm’s FOC and
[
∂(1 +Rijs(a))
∂ι
]
holding pijs(a) fixed =
Xtpijs(a)
1−
dsfijs
θsYi
P 1−is
[A1 − (1− ι)]2
ι
3ι+ 2[(1− ι)− A1]
6ι2 − 3[A1 − (1− ι)]2 > 0.
2.10 Appendix B: Financial constraints of small and medium
firms in Canada
Number of employees
2004 0 1-4 5-19 20-99 100-499
Demand or short-term loan Interest rate 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.6 7.1
Length of term (m) 9 10 7 10 9
Term loan Interest rate 6 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.9
Length of term (m) 53 71 56 65 83
New line of credit Interest rate 6 6.2 6.3 6.4 5
New credit card Interest rate 17.9 17.1 17.3 18.8 -
2007
Term loan or mortgage Interest rate 7.5 7.3 7.3 6.8 6.7
Length of term (m) 69.4 61.4 72 66.2 66.7
Operating line Interest rate 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.8
2011
All credit Interest rate - 7.2 6.7 5.8 4.9
Length of term (m) - 64 79 70 57
2014
Term loan Interest rate - 5.3 5.5 4.7 4.3
Length of term (m) - 63 59 57 50
Line of credit Interest rate - 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.8
Credit card Interest rate - 17.2 17 18.2 18.6
This table contains a subset of the answers to Statistics Canada’s Survey on Financing of
Small and Medium Enterprises for the years 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014. The table reports
the average interest rate and length of the term (in months, where relevant) of different
types of credit obtained by Canadian SMEs, classified by size.
Table 2.7: Average interest rate and maturity for different firm sizes
84
Number of employees
0 1-4 5-19 20-99 100-499
2000 - 68 76 85 -
2004 - 81 87 83 79
2007 85 75 90 89 98
2011 - 90 86 97 99
2014 - 83 81 88 98
This table contains a subset of the answers
to Statistics Canada’s Survey on Financing of
Small and Medium Enterprises for the years
2000, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014. The table
reports, by firm size category, the ratio of to-
tal (over all firms and financing instruments)
credit authorized to credit requested.
Table 2.8: Ratio (%) of credit authorized to credit requested
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3 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Models in a Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium Framework
3.1 Introduction
One of the main puzzles in international finance is the uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP) puzzle, also referred to as the foreign premium puzzle. The UIP puz-
zle is the empirical finding that countries with a higher risk-free interest rate tend
have currencies that appreciate in the short run. Typical two-country macroeconomic
models instead predict that high interest-rate currencies should depreciate, thus elim-
inating profitable carry trade strategies. If a high interest rate currency is expected
to appreciate against a low interest rate currency, then it is on average profitable for
an investor to borrow in the low interest rate currency and invest in a high interest
rate currency. In a typical representative-agent model with time-separable prefer-
ences and rational expectations, these profitable opportunities are arbitraged away,
and the high interest rate currency depreciates. Hence, the extensive empirical liter-
ature demonstrating that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate on average
has given rise to the UIP puzzle.
The international finance literature has responded with several alternatives to
typical two-country models in order to address the UIP puzzle. These alternatives
have been constructed to specifically address the UIP puzzle and are generally set
in endowment economies.58 That is, real variables such as production, consumption,
or interest rates follow exogenous processes. These alternative models provide useful
intuition about where UIP violations could come from. However, it remains unclear
whether they can successfully match UIP evidence when re-cast in a general equilib-
58One exception is Valchev (forthcoming).
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rium framework with endogenous production and consumption.
In this chapter, I test the robustness of the UIP predictions of two of the main
models that provide explanations to the UIP puzzle. I re-cast these models (sepa-
rately) in a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework and
examine how the UIP predictions are impacted. I investigate how the mechanisms
rely on specific parameter values in order to find under which conditions, if any, they
can explain the UIP puzzle. In addition, I obtain business cycle moments from model
simulations and compare them to the moments obtained from a standard two-country
DSGE model and from the data.
The two models that I investigate in this chapter are the habit model of Verdel-
han (2010) and the distorted beliefs model of Gourinchas & Tornell (2004). I find
that for the first model, the UIP results disappear under realistic calibrations. For the
second model, UIP properties remain under some calibrations. In addition, business
cycle predictions remain close to empirical evidence.
There is an extensive literature on the empirical violation of the theoretical UIP
relationship. Early work in the field began when advanced economies abandoned the
gold standard in the 1970s and exchange rates became free to float. Early studies
focused on testing the efficiency of the new currency markets by estimating whether
on average, the forward exchange rate was equal to the realization of the future ex-
change rate. Market efficiency was broadly rejected. The rejection of the currency
market efficiency hypothesis lead economists to consider the existence of risk premia
as an explanatory factor. When investing in foreign risk-free bonds, an investor does
not face a risk in terms of nominal returns in foreign currency, but instead a risk in
terms of nominal returns in his or her own currency, given that the future exchange
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rate is unknown. Hence, it is reasonable to expect a risk-averse investor to demand
a risk premium, that is, a return greater than the nominal risk-free rate, when in-
vesting in foreign bonds. Fama (1984) estimates simultaneously how variations in the
risk premium and in expectations of future spot rates can explain forward rates. He
finds that variations in the risk premium are by far the most important explanation.
However, using data on actual market expectations on the exchange rate, Froot &
Frankel (1989) are able to test whether UIP deviations are due to risk premia or to
errors in expectations. They find that expectation errors are able to explain all of
the deviations, thus questioning the mere existence of a risk premium. Most existing
theoretical models explaining the UIP puzzle follow one of these two views. One of
the models that I investigate in this chapter adopts the risk premium explanation
whereas the other relies on biased expectations of agents.
Testing for UIP can be done using the following regression:
st+m − st = βm0 + βm1(rt,m − r∗t,m) + εt+m (3.1)
where ∗ denotes the Foreign country, st denotes the natural logarithm of the spot ex-
change rate such that an increase in st represents a depreciation of the Home currency,
and rt,m denotes the natural logarithm of the m-period risk-free nominal interest rate.
The null hypothesis is βm0 = 0, βm1 = 1, meaning that if the Home interest rate is
higher than the Foreign interest rate, the Home currency depreciates on average. The
literature typically finds βm1 to be significantly smaller than one. Most papers in fact
find a negative βm1. This implies that on average, a country’s currency appreciates
when its interest rate is relatively high. A risk premium explanation to the UIP
puzzle requires that an additional term be missing from this equation, capturing a
time-varying risk premium. A constant risk premium would be captured by βm0 and
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would not bias βm1 even if omitted. The explanation to the UIP puzzle that relies on
expectation errors, such as that suggested by Froot & Frankel (1989), requires that
the error term εt+m be non-random, that is, that it varies systematically with the
behavior of the exchange rate.
More recent empirical evidence also rejects the UIP hypothesis. Burnside et al.
(2006) test the relationship for nine currencies against the British pound, for the pe-
riod between 1976 and 2005.59 They find that for all currency pairs, the relationship
is negative and that it is significantly negative in most cases. Other recent empirical
literature on the UIP puzzle tests whether carry-trade portfolios are profitable. Lustig
& Verdelhan (2007), for example, show that carry-trade strategies, when performed
using groups of assets, are highly profitable and of low risk.
The two main theoretical models explaining the UIP puzzle with time-varying
risk premia are Verdelhan (2010) and Colacito & Croce (2013). Verdelhan (2010)
includes external habit formation introduced by Campbell & Cochrane (1999) to an
otherwise frictionless two-country endowment economy. Because of habits, the agents’
degree of risk aversion varies over time, so that the risk premium that they demand
to invest abroad also varies over time. Hence, a high interest rate currency may
be expected to appreciate, but highly risk-averse agents from the low interest rate
country may still not be willing to invest there. Colacito & Croce (2013) modify the
one-country model of Bansal & Yaron (2004) that includes recursive preferences and
long-run risk by also setting it in a frictionless two-country endowment economy. Re-
cursive preferences cause the agents’ degree of risk aversion to vary over time, similar
59The authors test the relationship
(
St+1
St
− 1
)
= α + β
(
Ft
St
− 1
)
+ εt where Ft is the one-period
forward exchange rate. Forward rate are sometimes used instead of risk-free interest rates because
they are available for more maturities and more currencies, and because they are more comparable
across currency pairs. The authors and numerous other researchers find that the covered interest
parity relationship FtSt =
1+Rt
1+R∗t
generally holds in their sample.
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to the external habit model. However, the implications of these two models for the
behavior of interest rates are quite different. The external habit model of Verdelhan
(2010) relies on the risk-free interest rate being low for the economy that is in rela-
tively “bad times” compared to the other country. The recursive preferences model of
Colacito & Croce (2013) relies on the risk-free interest rate in the country that is ex-
pected to grow more, that is the country that is in relatively “good times,” to be lower.
The other side of the literature instead questions the rationality of expectations
or behavior of agents. Gourinchas & Tornell (2004) model agents’ beliefs about the
conduct of monetary policy as slightly distorted: agents believe that there is a con-
stant probability that monetary authorities are subject to a one-time shock, and are
unable to distinguish such shocks from actual persistent monetary shocks. This leads
them to react slowly to monetary shocks, as they learn their true nature, and can
cause a high-interest rate currency to continue to appreciate for several periods. Bac-
chetta & van Wincoop (2010) instead argue that agents make infrequent portfolio
decisions. The result is similar to the distorted beliefs mechanism: even if agents
perfectly observe shocks, they can only react to it slowly. Other models of biased
expectations include Ilut (2012), who assumes that agents are ambiguity-averse and
have access to limited information, and Lansing & Ma (2017), who use a model of
bounded rationality of agents to explain the UIP puzzle.
In the first part of this chapter, I find that the UIP results disappear when the
habit model is re-cast is a standard DSGE framework. Verdelhan’s (2010) results rely
on the households’ precautionary saving motive being stronger than their intertem-
poral smoothing motive in the determination of interest rates. When this is the case,
interest rates are procyclical, so that interest rates and risk premia are negatively
correlated. This makes the UIP coefficient smaller than zero. Verdelhan obtains this
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result by assuming that the consumption process is a random walk. When the con-
sumption process is instead mean-reverting (for example, because technology or the
monetary shock process are mean-reverting) or when consumption growth is time-
varying but predictable for other reasons (such as the presence of sticky prices), the
intertemporal smoothing motive dominates. As a result, interest rates are counter-
cyclical and the UIP coefficient is close to one.
In the second part of this chapter, I find that re-casting the distorted beliefs
model in a DSGE framework does not alter its theoretical UIP properties. However,
the assumptions about the shock processes are crucial to obtain a negative UIP co-
efficient. Monetary shocks must be more persistent than is typically assumed, and
beliefs must be highly distorted. These conditions are necessary to obtain a coefficient
significantly below one. This model is able to explain the UIP puzzle and preserve
other moments in a DSGE framework.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I describe the
baseline two-country DSGE framework and its UIP properties. Sections 3.3 and
3.4 contain the description of and results for the habit and distorted beliefs models,
respectively. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Baseline Model
Each of the UIP mechanisms investigated in this chapter is introduced in an
otherwise standard two-country DSGE framework inspired from Clarida et al. (2002)
(CGG). In this section, I describe this framework and demonstrate why it cannot
account for UIP empirical evidence.
The two countries, Home and Foreign, are symmetric except for the shocks they
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face. In each country, a representative household gets positive utility from consump-
tion and negative utility from working. Each country produces two types of goods.
Intermediate differentiated goods are produced using domestic labor and technology.
Final goods are produced using country-specific intermediate goods. Households con-
sume final goods produced domestically and abroad, but may prefer the goods pro-
duced in their own country. Nominal prices of intermediate goods are sticky and
monetary policy is based on a Taylor-type rule. Markets are complete both nation-
ally and internationally, which implies that all agents in all countries are affected
equally by stochastic shocks.
3.2.1 Households
There is a measure one of households in each country. The representative house-
hold in the Home country maximizes the present discounted value of its lifetime utility
given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (3.2)
where β is the household discount factor. The intra-period utility function is given
by
U(Ct, Nt) =
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1 + φ
(3.3)
where Ct is the consumption level, Nt is the number of hours worked, σ is both the
degree of risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The assumption of com-
plete financial markets insures that all households within a country are identical and
allows the analysis of the representative household.
The household’s consumption basket is composed of two final goods: one pro-
duced domestically and one produced abroad. The household has constant elasticity
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of substitution (CES) preferences over these two final goods, which implies that the
Home household’s consumption basket satisfies
Ct =
[
γ
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H,t + (1− γ)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
, (3.4)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a preference parameter such that there is home bias if γ > 0.5
and θ is the elasticity of substitution between the Home and the Foreign final goods.
Minimizing the cost of a basket containing one unit of Home consumption Ct yields
the following consumer price index:
Pt =
[
γ(PH,t)
1−θ + (1− γ)(PF,t)1−θ
] 1
1−θ (3.5)
where PH,t is the price paid for the final good produced in Home and PF,t is the price
paid (in Home currency) for the final good produced in Foreign.
The representative household’s utility-maximization problem is given by
max
{Ct,Nt,Dt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+φt
1 + φ
]
(3.6)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = WtNt +Dt − Tt + Γt ∀t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.7)
where Qt,t+1 is the household’s stochastic discount factor, Dt+1 is the payoff at t+ 1
of the portfolio purchased by the household at time t, Wt is the nominal wage, Tt is
lump sum taxes raised by the government and Γt is lump sum profits coming from
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domestic firms producing intermediate goods.60
The first-order conditions for consumption and labor imply:
CH,t = γ
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Ct (3.8)
CF,t = (1− γ)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Ct (3.9)
Nφt
Wt
=
C−σt
Pt
. (3.10)
The household’s nominal stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1 satisfies
Qt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(3.11)
and the nominal risk-free interest rate satisfies
1
1 +Rt
= Et{Qt,t+1}. (3.12)
The Euler equation is therefore given by:
1
1 +Rt
= βEt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
]
. (3.13)
The Foreign representative household faces a symmetric utility-maximization
problem, that is to maximize
max
{C∗t ,N∗t ,D∗t+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(C∗t )
1−σ
1− σ −
(N∗t )
1+φ
1 + φ
]
(3.14)
60Firms producing the final good are perfectly competitive and earn no profit.
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subject to the sequence of budget constraints
P ∗t C
∗
t + Et{Q∗t,t+1D∗t+1} = W ∗t N∗t +D∗t − T ∗t + Γ∗t ∀t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.15)
where
C∗t =
[
(1− γ) 1θ (C∗H,t)
θ−1
θ + γ
1
θ (C∗F,t)
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 (3.16)
P ∗t =
[
(1− γ)(P ∗H,t)1−θ + γ(P ∗F,t)1−θ
] 1
1−θ (3.17)
The first-order conditions imply
C∗H,t = (1− γ)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−θ
C∗t (3.18)
C∗F,t = γ
(
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−θ
C∗t (3.19)
(N∗t )
φ
W ∗t
=
(C∗t )
−σ
P ∗t
(3.20)
and
1
1 +R∗t
= Et{Q∗t,t+1} (3.21)
where
Q∗t,t+1 = β
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
. (3.22)
The terms of trade, TOTt, are defined as the ratio of the price of the Foreign
good to the price of the Home good, both expressed in Home’s currency:
TOTt ≡ PF,t
PH,t
. (3.23)
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The consumer price indices can then be expressed as
(
Pt
PH,t
)1−θ
= γ + (1− γ)TOT 1−θt (3.24)(
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
)1−θ
= γ + (1− γ)TOT θ−1t (3.25)
and the consumers’ demand functions can be expressed as
CH,t = γ
(
γ + (1− γ)TOT 1−θt
) θ
1−θ Ct (3.26)
CF,t = (1− γ)
(
(1− γ) + γTOT θ−1t
) θ
1−θ Ct (3.27)
C∗H,t = (1− γ)
(
(1− γ) + γTOT 1−θt
) θ
1−θ C∗t (3.28)
C∗F,t = γ
(
γ + (1− γ)TOT θ−1t
) θ
1−θ C∗t . (3.29)
Prices are assumed to be set in the producer’s currency, and the law of one price
implies
PH,t = StP
∗
H,t (3.30)
PF,t = StP
∗
F,t (3.31)
where St is the nominal exchange rate defined as the amount of Home currency that
can be exchanged for one unit of Foreign currency. An increase in St corresponds to
a depreciation of the Home currency. The terms of trade can then be expressed as
TOTt = St
P ∗F,t
PH,t
. (3.32)
Risk sharing Under complete financial markets, the intertemporal marginal rates
of substitution of households, or stochastic discount factors Qt,t+1 and Q∗t,t+1, are
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equalized across countries.61 These variables are expressed in different units: Home’s
stochastic discount factor is expressed in Home currency this period per unit of Home
currency unit next period, whereas Foreign’s stochastic discount factor is expressed in
Foreign currency this period per unit of Foreign currency unit next period. Equalizing
the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution therefore requires a nominal exchange
rate adjustment:
Qt,t+1 =
St
St+1
Q∗t,t+1. (3.33)
Thus risk sharing determines the exchange rate process. Note that this equation holds
exactly, not only in expectation. Because of the presence of complete international
financial markets, perfect risk sharing is achieved in every period.
The behavior of the real exchange rate RERt is determined similarly, equalizing
the real stochastic discounts factors RQt,t+1 and RQ∗t,t+1 across countries:
RERt+1
RERt
=
RQ∗t,t+1
RQt,t+1
where RQt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
and RQ∗t,t+1 = β
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
. This implies the usual
definition of the real exchange rate
RERt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
. (3.34)
3.2.2 Firms
In each country, production happens in two stages. Intermediate good producers
produce differentiated intermediate goods in a monopolistically competitive market.
61Because of home bias in preferences, consumption baskets differ across countries and complete
risk sharing does not imply equal consumption growth across countries.
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They use the available domestic technology and labor, and face price-setting rigidities
à la Calvo (1983). Final good producers produce final goods by combining all domestic
intermediate goods. They operate in a perfectly competitive market and face no price
rigidity.
Final good producers There is a measure one of final good producers in each
country. Each of them combines the intermediate goods in a CES fashion:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(f)
ξ−1
ξ df
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.35)
where Yt is the amount of final good produced, Yt(f) is the amount of differentiated
intermediate good f used as input, and ξ is the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods produced domestically. There is a measure one of intermediate
goods being produced in each country.
Cost-minimization by final good producers yields the producer price index
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(f)
1−ξdf
) 1
1−ξ
(3.36)
where PH,t(f) is the price of a specific intermediate good f , and the demand function
Yt(f) =
(
PH,t(f)
PH,t
)−ξ
Yt. (3.37)
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The corresponding equations for the Foreign country are
Y ∗t =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(f
∗)
ξ−1
ξ df ∗
) ξ
ξ−1
(3.38)
P ∗F,t =
(∫ 1
0
P ∗F,t(f
∗)1−ξdf ∗
) 1
1−ξ
(3.39)
Yt(f
∗) =
(
P ∗F,t(f
∗)
P ∗F,t
)−ξ
Y ∗t . (3.40)
Intermediate good producers Each intermediate good producer f combines la-
bor Nt(f) and the available technology At according to
Yt(f) = AtNt(f) (3.41)
and faces a subsidy rate of τ . The cost-minimization problem for the choice of labor
yields
MCt = (1− τ)Wt
At
(3.42)
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost of the intermediate firm.62
Intermediate firms are operating in a monopolistically competitive market. Fol-
lowing Calvo (1983), they can only reset their price with a probability of 1 − α in
each period. When receiving a signal that they can change their price, intermediate
firms choose the optimal price POH,t by maximizing their profit:
Et
∞∑
j=0
αjQt,t+jYt+j(f)
[
POH,t −MCt+j
]
(3.43)
62As noted by CGG, constant returns to scale in technology insures that the marginal cost is
the same for all intermediate firms, regardless of their level of production. This assumption insures
tractability in the presence of price rigidities.
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subject to the demand function (3.37) coming from final good producers. The result-
ing optimal price satisfies the condition
Et
∞∑
j=0
αjQt,t+jYt+j(f)
[
POH,t −
(
1 +
1
ξ − 1
)
MCt+j
]
= 0, (3.44)
that is, on weighted average over all periods during which POH,t is expected to remain
the firm’s price, this price must cover the marginal cost plus a constant markup of
1
ξ−1 .
63 Firms that cannot reset their price keep their price from the previous period.
By the law of large numbers, the price index PH,t satisfies
PH,t =
[
α(PH,t−1)1−ξ + (1− α)(POH,t)1−ξ
] 1
1−ξ . (3.45)
Combining equations (3.44) and (3.45) yields an expression in terms of t − 1, t,
and t+ 1 only:
PH,t−1
(
1
1− α(1 + piH,t)
1−ξ − α
1− α
) 1
1−ξ
=
NNt
DDt
(3.46)
where
NNt =
(
1 +
1
ξ − 1
)
P ξH,tYtMCt + αEtQt,t+1NNt+1 (3.47)
DDt = P
ξ
H,tYt + αEtQt,t+1DDt+1 (3.48)
(1 + piH,t) =
PH,t
PH,t−1
. (3.49)
63Note that if prices were fully flexible (α = 0), the optimal price would be POH,t = (1 +
1
ξ−1 )MCt.
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The corresponding equations for the Foreign country are
Yt(f
∗) = A∗tNt(f
∗) (3.50)
MC∗t = (1− τ)
W ∗t
A∗t
(3.51)
Et
∞∑
j=0
αjQ∗t,t+jYt+j(f
∗)
[
PO∗F,t −
(
1 +
1
ξ − 1
)
MC∗t+j
]
= 0 (3.52)
P ∗F,t =
[
α(P ∗F,t−1)
1−ξ + (1− α)(PO∗F,t )1−ξ
] 1
1−ξ (3.53)
P ∗F,t−1
(
1
1− α(1 + pi
∗
F,t)
1−ξ − α
1− α
) 1
1−ξ
=
NN∗t
DD∗t
(3.54)
NN∗t =
(
1 +
1
ξ − 1
)
(P ∗F,t)
ξY ∗t MC
∗
t + αEtQ
∗
t,t+1NN
∗
t+1 (3.55)
DD∗t = (P
∗
F,t)
ξY ∗t + αEtQ
∗
t,t+1DD
∗
t+1 (3.56)
(1 + pi∗F,t) =
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
. (3.57)
3.2.3 Monetary policy
In each country, a central bank sets the nominal interest rate 1 +Rt in response
to current consumer-price inflation and past nominal interest rate. Monetary policy
is subject to a (log) first-order autoregressive innovation MSt:
(1 +Rt) = (1 +Rt−1)φi
(
1
β
)1−φi ( Pt
Pt−1
)(1−φi)φpi
MSt (3.58)
(1 +R∗t ) = (1 +R
∗
t−1)
φi
(
1
β
)1−φi ( P ∗t
P ∗t−1
)(1−φi)φpi
MS∗t . (3.59)
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3.2.4 Market clearing
Market clearing in the goods markets implies
Yt = CH,t + C
∗
H,t (3.60)
Y ∗t = CF,t + C
∗
F,t. (3.61)
Market clearing in the labor markets implies
∫ 1
0
Nt(f)df = Nt (3.62)∫ 1
0
Nt(f
∗)df ∗ = N∗t . (3.63)
3.2.5 Equilibrium
Combining the labor market clearing condition (3.62) to the demand for inter-
mediate inputs (3.37) and the production function (3.41) yields
AtNt = YtVt, (3.64)
where
Vt =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(f)
PH,t
)−ξ
df (3.65)
is a measure of the price dispersion.
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Similarly for the Foreign country,
A∗tN
∗
t = Y
∗
t V
∗
t (3.66)
V ∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
P ∗F,t(f
∗)
P ∗F,t
)−ξ
df ∗. (3.67)
Using equations (3.45) and (3.53), it can be shown that
Vt = α(1 + piH,t)
ξ + (1− α)
[
1− α(1 + piH,t)ξ−1
1− α
] ξ
ξ−1
(3.68)
V ∗t = α(1 + pi
∗
F,t)
ξ + (1− α)
[
1− α(1 + pi∗F,t)ξ−1
1− α
] ξ
ξ−1
. (3.69)
An equilibrium for this model is then defined as an allocation for the variables
Nt, N∗t , Ct, C∗t , Wt, W ∗t , Pt, P ∗t , Rt, R∗t , CH,t, C∗H,t, CF,t, C∗F,t, PH,t, P ∗F,t, Yt, Y ∗t ,
Vt, V ∗t , piH,t, pi∗F,t, MCt, MC∗t , NNt, NN∗t , DDt, DD∗t , Qt,t+1, Q∗t,t+1, TOTt, and St
that satisfies the equations (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), (3.24), (3.25),
(3.26), (3.27), (3.28), (3.29), (3.32), (3.33), (3.42), (3.46), (3.47), (3.48), (3.49), (3.51),
(3.54), (3.55), (3.56), (3.57), (3.58), (3.59), (3.60), (3.61), (3.64), (3.66), (3.68), and
(3.69), given the exogenous processes for At, A∗t , MSt, and MS∗t given by:
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logAt = ρA logAt−1 + εA,t (3.70)
logA∗t = ρA logA
∗
t−1 + ε
∗
A,t (3.71)
logMSt = ρR logMSt−1 + εR,t (3.72)
logMS∗t = ρR logMS
∗
t−1 + ε
∗
R,t (3.73)εA,t
ε∗A,t
 ∼ N(0,ΣAΣ′A) (3.74)
εR,t
ε∗R,t
 ∼ N(0,ΣRΣ′R). (3.75)
3.2.6 UIP implications
Taking logs and expectation at time t of the risk sharing equation determining
the behavior of the real exchange rate, I obtain64
Et(∆rert+1) = Etrq
∗
t,t+1 − Etrqt,t+1
Using the Euler equation, I can express the log of the real interest rate (denoted
rrt) as rrt = −logEtRQt,t+1. If the stochastic discount factor follows a log-normal
distribution, then
rrt = −Etrqt,t+1 − 1
2
vart(rqt,t+1)
64A lower case letter indicates the natural log of a variable: xt = logXt.
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where vart(xt+1) indicated the expected variance of xt+1 from the perspective of
period t.65 Then, the expected change in the exchange rate can be expressed as
Et(∆rert+1) = rrt − rr∗t +
1
2
[
vart(rqt,t+1)− vart(rq∗t,t+1)
]
. (3.76)
In this model, a UIP coefficient different from one (βUIP 6= 1) can only be obtained if
the variance of the stochastic discount factors is allowed to be time-varying. Hence,
the model must be solved using at least a third-order approximation.
From the definition of the stochastic discount factor, vart(rqt,t+1) = σ2vart(∆ct+1),
so that
Et(∆rert+1) = rt − r∗t +
σ2
2
[
vart(∆ct+1)− vart(∆c∗t+1)
]
(3.77)
To obtain an estimated βUIP 6= 1, it must be that
cov
(
rt − r∗t ,
σ2
2
[
vart(∆ct+1)− vart(∆c∗t+1)
]) 6= 0.
A necessary condition to obtain a negative UIP coefficient is that this covariance must
be strictly negative.66 In this baseline model, however, there is no mechanism that
causes this relationship to be negative. How Ct+1 is expected at time t to react to
shocks coming at time t+ 1 is independent from the state of the economy at time t.
Hence, vart(∆ct+1)− vart(∆c∗t+1) does not systematically covary with rrt − rr∗t , and
βUIP = 1 even when the model is solved using a third-order approximation.
65The log-normality assumption is not imposed on the model when solving or simulating it, or
when estimating UIP coefficients. It is only made in the text in order to describe the approximate
effect of the first and second moments of the stochastic discounts factors on the exchange rate.
66If the covariance is strictly negative, then the estimated βUIP is negatively biased due to the
omitted variable.
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3.2.7 Calibration
Table 3.1 contains the benchmark calibration, which is fairly standard. This is
a quarterly model. I assume that α, the degree of price stickiness, is equal to 0.75,
which implies that prices hold on average for four quarters. The household’s discount
factor, β, is set to 0.99, which implies an annualized rate of around 4 percent on the
one-period nominal bond in steady state. The elasticity of substitution between the
intermediate goods produced within the same country, ξ, is set to 7.66, which implies a
markup over marginal cost in steady state of about 15 percent. The subsidy parameter
τ is calibrated so that firms charge the perfect competition price ((1− τ)(1 +µ) = 1).
The elasticity of substitution in consumption between the Home and the Foreign bond
is a parameter about which there is disagreement in the literature. It is common to
set it to a value between 1 and 2 when using a two-country macroeconomic DSGE
model. I choose a value of 1.5. The degree of home bias in consumption γ is set to
0.85, implying an import-to-consumption ratio of 15 percent in steady state.67 The
inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, φ, is set to 1.5. The households’ degree
of risk aversion, and the inverse of their intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is set
to 2. The monetary authority is assumed to smooth interest rate, φi = 0.8, and to
target inflation with a coefficient of φpi = 2, following the results in Smets & Wouters
(2007). The persistence of the log of technology, ρA, is set to 0.95 and the coefficient
for the monetary shock, ρR, is set to 0.12, both also following the results in Smets &
Wouters (2007). The standard deviations of the technology and monetary shocks are
0.0075 and 0.0040, respectively. The size of the monetary shock is chosen to match the
on-impact effect on the nominal interest rate found in Eichenbaum & Evans (1995).
The relative magnitude of the technology shock (σA/σR) is chosen to match results
found in Smets & Wouters (2007).
67According to data from the US International Trade Commission and from the St. Louis Fed
FRED database, the annual average of the ratio of imports for consumption to total household
consumption between 1973 and 2015 is 0.15.
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3.2.8 Baseline model impulse response functions
Figure 3.1 contains the impulse responses of the main variables of the model to a
positive technology shock in the Home country.68 An increase in technology in Home
increases the productivity of the workers in Home and, therefore, increases their real
wage. The higher real wage has two effects on hours worked: a substitution effect,
according to which leisure is now more expensive, prompting workers to work more,
and an income effect according to which a higher real wage means that workers can
consume the same by working less, prompting them to work less. According to my
calibration (intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5), the income effect dom-
inates, and workers in Home reduce their hours worked. However, hours decrease
less than technology improves, so that Home output increases. Because of the lower
marginal cost, the price of the Home good decreases. A lower relative price makes
consumers in both Home and Foreign to increase their consumption of the Home good.
Risk sharing ensures that changes in the marginal utility of consumption are
equalized across countries. Therefore, since the technology shock made the Home
households better off, the Foreign households need to be compensated. The Foreign
currency appreciates against the Home currency, so that it is now cheaper for Foreign
consumers to buy the Home good. This decreases the Foreign consumption price
level, increasing the Foreign households’ real wage. Since the income effect of the
change in real wage dominates, hours and production decrease.
Because the relative price of the Home good is lower, both countries want to
shift their consumption towards the Home good. Hence, Home consumers increase
68These impulse responses have been computed using a third-order approximation of the model.
The impulse responses obtained using the first-order approximation of the model are not significantly
different. Variables in all impulse responses are expressed in natural logarithmic differences from
their steady state.
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their consumption of the Home good and decrease their consumption of the Foreign
good. However, because of Home bias, Foreign households actually increase their
consumption of both goods (they have a higher purchasing power because real wage
increases more than hours worked decrease), but that of the Home good increases
more. Overall, both countries’ consumption prices decrease, so that both monetary
authorities choose to decrease the nominal interest rate.
Figure 3.2 contains the impulse responses of the main variables of the model to
a contractionary monetary shock in the Home country when prices are sticky. In a
flexible-price world, a monetary shock affects only nominal variables: a positive shock
on the nominal interest rate induces agents to save more, and thus it decreases their
demand for goods. Home producers are able to decrease their price enough so that
real demand is not affected: production continues at the same level. Nominal wages
follow the nominal prices, and the real wage is not affected. Foreign producers do not
face a decrease in demand for Foreign consumers, so they do not decrease their price.
However, risk sharing requires the nominal exchange rate to decrease (Home currency
appreciates). Since Foreign goods are now relatively cheaper for Home consumers,
but Home consumers want to consume less because of the upward pressure on the
interest rate, the demand remains the same and Foreign production remains the same.
In a world where prices are sticky, however, Home intermediate producers are
not able to decrease their price enough so that the price of the Home final good is
“artifically” relatively high. Home consumers are unable to save, so that if they de-
crease consumption of the Home good, they have to increase their consumption of
the Foreign good. This is achieved in equilibrium by an appreciation of the Home
currency: the Foreign good is now relatively cheaper to Home consumers even though
Foreign producers actually increase their price. Since the price of the Home good can-
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not be decreased enough while the Foreign currency depreciates, Foreign consumers’
demand for the Home good decreases. As a result, Home production decreases and
Foreign production increases: both types of consumers switch towards the Foreign
good and away from the Home good. Since the consumer price index decreases in
Home and increases in Foreign, monetary authorities in Home decrease the Home
nominal interest rate and Foreign authorities increase their rate. Overall, the Home
monetary authority’s action is weaker than the initial shock, so that the nominal
interest increases on impact.
UIP predictions A positive technology shock in Home causes negative inflation
in both countries, but more so in the country directly hit by the shock. Therefore,
the Home monetary authority decreases the nominal interest rate by more. In the
same time, the Home currency depreciates in both nominal and real terms before
re-appreciating towards its steady-state value. A contractionary monetary shock in
Home causes the interest rates to increase more in Home than in Foreign. On impact,
the Home currency appreciates in both nominal and real terms, and then depreciates
back towards its steady-state value. These impulse responses make clear that when
the Home interest rate is higher than the Foreign interest rate, the Home currency
is expected to depreciate, and vice versa. There is no mechanism in this model that
could explain why it is high interest rate currencies that tend to appreciate on average.
3.2.9 Baseline model simulation results
Since one of the models analyzed in this chapter needs to be approximated to a
third order, simulation results for the baseline model are obtained from both a first-
order and a third-order approximation. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.2 contain selected
simulation moments for the first- and third-order approximations, respectively. The
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order of approximation has only a small impact on the moments obtained. The sim-
ulated moments are compared to data moments obtained for the United States and,
where relevant, an aggregate of the non-US G7 countries: Japan, United Kingdom,
Germany, Italy, France, and Canada.
Both for data and simulations, the nominal UIP coefficient is the coefficient
βUIPnom resulting from the following regression:
log(St+1)− log(St) = αUIPnom + βUIPnom[log(1 +Rt)− log(1 +R∗t )] + et
The real UIP coefficient is obtained similarly. Note that the expectation operator
does not appear on the left-hand side of the UIP regression equation. The expecta-
tion error is therefore included in the error term et. Since this is a model of rational
expectations, this expectation error is zero on average by construction.
The simulation results show that the baseline model reproduces some of the data
moments rather well: consumption and interest rates are less volatile than GDP, and
GDP, consumption, and interest rates are very autocorrelated. The volatility of the
change in exchange rates is also well predicted by the model. The baseline model
fails to predict the relatively high volatility of hours worked. The model predicts
negative correlation of output across countries, while this correlation is high and
positive in the data. In the model, shocks are uncorrelated across countries so that
risk sharing implies the negative correlation of outputs. A positive correlation could
be obtained by (realistically) making technology shocks positively correlated across
countries. Risk sharing in the model also implies that consumption is more positively
correlated across countries than GDP, whereas the data show the opposite. This
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is known as the international consumption correlation puzzle.69 The model does
the most poorly in the exchange rate moments. The autocorrelation of changes in
exchange rated is positive in the data, but negative in the model: impulse responses
above show that on impact of a shock, exchange rates react in one direction, and then
immediately revert back towards the opposite direction. The data suggest that this
is not the correct predicted behavior. Finally, UIP coefficients are very close to one
in the model, but zero or negative in the data.
3.3 Model with External Habits
In this section I first summarize the model with external habits introduced in
Verdelhan (2010) and describe how it solves the UIP puzzle. I then insert habit
preferences into the baseline model introduced in the previous section and examine
the implications for the UIP puzzle. I discuss the (extreme) conditions required for
this version of the model to solve the UIP puzzle.
3.3.1 The habit model of Verdelhan (2010)
In a model inspired by Campbell & Cochrane (1999), Verdelhan (2010) suggests a
solution to the UIP puzzle that relies on the introduction of external habits in house-
holds’ preferences. The utility that households get from consumption depends on
how the current consumption level relates to an external habit level. The habit level
is called external because it depends on (country-specific) aggregate consumption.70
For a given level of consumption, the household gets more utility if this consumption
level is much greater than the current habit level than if it is only slightly greater.
As a result, the household is more risk averse when its consumption level is close to
69See Backus et al. (1992).
70This implies that when maximizing utility, agents ignore the impact of their own consumption
on the level of habit.
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the habit level (but still above it) than when it is farther away from it.71
The presence of external habits in the utility function implies that risk aversion
varies over time, which in turn implies that the risk premium demanded by households
to invest in risky assets also varies over time.72 If the risk premium demanded by
Home households to invest in Foreign bonds is very high at a time where the risk-free
rate on the Home bond is lower than the rate on the Foreign bond, then the Home
households may decide not to take advantage of this apparent profit opportunity.
Hence, it is possible to obtain a negative UIP coefficient: it can be that the Foreign
interest rate is relatively high and the Foreign currency is simultaneously expected to
appreciate. This requires risk-free rates to be procyclical: when Home is in relatively
“bad” times and risk aversion is higher in Home, interest rates must be lower in Home.
Verdelhan (2010) shows that in his endowment-economy model, this condition
requires precautionary saving motives to be stronger than intertemporal smoothing
motives. In order to smooth consumption, households have to save in good times,
putting downward pressure on the interest rate. However, if households are more
risk averse in bad times, they also have more incentives to save in bad times, also
putting downward pressure on the interest rate. The cyclicality of interest rates, and
therefore the ability of the model to explain the UIP puzzle, depends on the relative
strength of these two opposing forces.
3.3.2 The DSGE model with external habits
This version of the model combines the DSGE model described in Section 3.2
with the preference specification introduced by Campbell & Cochrane (1999) and
71By construction, the consumption level cannot fall below the habit level.
72“Risk-free” Foreign assets are risky from the perspective of Home households since the exchange
rate at the time of the asset’s maturity is uncertain at the time of purchase.
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used by Verdelhan (2010) in the context of the UIP puzzle. The only difference from
the baseline model is the presence of external habits in the households’ preferences.
Households The representative household in the Home country maximizes the
present discounted value of its lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(Ct, Ht, Nt)] (3.78)
where the intra-period utility function is now given by
U(Ct, Ht, Nt) =
(Ct −Ht)1−σ
1− σ −
N1+φt
1 + φ
, (3.79)
where Ht is the external habit level. The external habit level depends indirectly on
domestic consumption. Let the surplus consumption ratio, Xt, be defined as
Xt ≡ Ct −Ht
Ct
. (3.80)
Following Verdelhan (2010) and Campbell & Cochrane (1999), the log of the surplus
consumption ratio, xt, is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process:
xt+1 = (1− ν)x+ νxt + λ(xt)(∆ct+1 − g), (3.81)
where g is the average consumption growth rate. Verdelhan (2010) assumes con-
sumption growth to be exogenous, with mean g. In this chapter, I assume a setting
in which consumption is endogenous to the model and where there are no permanent
technological shocks so that g = g∗ = 0. ν is a parameter between zero and one,
x is the natural log of the steady state surplus consumption ratio X, and λ(xt) is
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a function of xt that determines how sensitive the surplus consumption ratio is to
consumption growth.
Following Campbell & Cochrane (1999) and Verdelhan (2010), the sensitivity
function λ(xt) is defined as
λ(xt) =

1
X
√
1− 2(xt − x)− 1 when xt ≤ xmax;
0 elsewhere
(3.82)
where xmax is an upper bound on xt. Hence, the function λ(xt) is decreasing in xt.
In good times, xt is much greater than x¯ and consumption growth affects the surplus
consumption ratio relatively weakly. In bad times, λ(xt) is high and the surplus con-
sumption ratio is strongly affected by consumption growth.
The consumption-labor intratemporal optimality condition is now given by
Nφt = (Ct −Ht)−σ
Wt
Pt
(3.83)
whereas the household’s nominal and real stochastic discount factors are now given
by
Qt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1 −Ht+1
Ct −Ht
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
= β
(
Xt+1
Xt
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(3.84)
RQt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1 −Ht+1
Ct −Ht
)−σ
= β
(
Xt+1
Xt
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(3.85)
The Foreign representative household faces a symmetric utility-maximization
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problem. where the surplus consumption ratio evolves according to
x∗t+1 = (1− ν)x∗ + νx∗t + λ(x∗t )(∆c∗t+1 − g∗) (3.86)
λ(x∗t ) =

1
X∗
√
1− 2(x∗t − x∗)− 1 when x∗t ≤ x∗max;
0 elsewhere
(3.87)
The first-order conditions imply
(N∗t )
φ = (C∗t −H∗t )−σ
W ∗t
P ∗t
(3.88)
Q∗t,t+1 = β
(
C∗t+1 −H∗t+1
C∗t −H∗t
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
= β
(
X∗t+1
X∗t
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
(3.89)
RQ∗t,t+1 = β
(
C∗t+1 −H∗t+1
C∗t −H∗t
)−σ
= β
(
X∗t+1
X∗t
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
. (3.90)
Risk sharing In this version of the model, risk sharing still implies that stochastic
discount factors are equalized across countries. The only difference is the definition
of these factors, which now includes terms for the surplus consumption ratios.
Firms, monetary policy, and market clearing The rest of the model is identical
to the baseline model. The stochastic discount factor used by intermediate firms to
discount expected future profits comes from the household’s optimization problem,
and therefore involves the surplus consumption ratio.
Equilibrium An equilibrium for this model is defined as an allocation for the vari-
ables Nt, N∗t , Ct, C∗t , Xt, X∗t , λ(xt), λ(x∗t ), Wt, W ∗t , Pt, P ∗t , Rt, R∗t , CH,t, C∗H,t, CF,t,
C∗F,t, PH,t, P ∗F,t, Yt, Y ∗t , Vt, V ∗t , piH,t, pi∗F,t, MCt, MC∗t , NNt, NN∗t , DDt, DD∗t , Qt,t+1,
Q∗t,t+1, TOTt, and St, that satisfies the equations (3.81), (3.82), (3.83), (3.84), (3.86),
(3.87), (3.88), (3.89), and the equations identical to the baseline model (3.12), (3.21),
(3.24), (3.25), (3.26), (3.27), (3.28), (3.29), (3.32), (3.33), (3.42), (3.46), (3.47), (3.48),
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(3.49), (3.51), (3.54), (3.55), (3.56), (3.57), (3.60), (3.61), (3.58), (3.59), (3.64), (3.66),
(3.68), and (3.69), given the exogenous processes for At, A∗t , MSt, and MS∗t given by
(3.70), (3.71), (3.72), (3.73), (3.74), and (3.75).
3.3.3 UIP implications
As in the baseline model, the expected change in the real exchange rate satisfies73
Et(∆rert+1) = rrt − rr∗t +
1
2
[
vart(rqt,t+1)− vart(rq∗t,t+1)
]
.
In this model the stochastic discount factor includes the change in the surplus con-
sumption ratio in addition to the change in consumption. Using the law of motion
for the log of the surplus consumption ratio xt (equation (3.81)) I obtain
vart(rqt,t+1) = σ
2[1 + λ(xt)]
2vart(∆ct+1),
so that the expected change in the exchange rate can be expressed as
Et(∆rert+1) = rrt − rr∗t +
σ2
2
(
[1 + λ(xt)]
2vart(∆ct+1)− [1 + λ(x∗t )]2vart(∆c∗t+1)
)
.
(3.91)
Hence in this model, even if the conditional variance of the change in consumption is
approximately constant, the omitted variable bias present in the typical UIP regres-
sions is non-zero. The effect of the conditional variance terms on the exchange rate
depends on the current state of the economy, that is, whether each country has a high
or low surplus consumption ratio. As a result, the sign of the correlation between rel-
ative interest rates (rrt−rr∗t ) and relative states (xt−x∗t ) governs the sign of the bias.
73The UIP implications of this model are analyzed in real terms for simplicity. The nominal UIP
implications are analogous.
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In order to understand how a UIP coefficient smaller than one, or even negative,
can be obtained in this model, it is useful to study the behavior of interest rates.
Using again the log-normality of stochastic discount factors assumption to expose the
intuition more clearly, the real interest rate satisfies
rrt = − log(β)−σ(1−ν)(xt− x¯) +σ[1 +λ(xt)]Et(∆ct+1)− σ
2
2
[1 +λ(xt)]
2vart(∆ct+1).
(3.92)
The term σ(1− ν)(xt− x¯) captures the households’ intertemporal smoothing motive.
Because the surplus consumption ratio is mean-reverting, a low ratio means that the
state of the economy will improve and agents have incentives to borrow now, putting
upward pressure on the interest rate. The term σ[1 + λ(xt)]Et(∆ct+1) also captures
the households’ intertemporal smoothing motive. For a given value of xt, an expected
increase in consumption makes the households want to borrow, which again increases
the interest rate. Note that in a model where real variables are mean-reverting, an
expected increase in consumption is associated with low current levels of consumption
and surplus consumption ratio. This magnifies the effects of the expected growth in
consumption on the interest rate since λ(xt) is decreasing in xt.
The last term, −σ2
2
[1 + λ(xt)]
2vart(∆ct+1), instead captures the households’ pre-
cautionary saving motives. Assume that vart(∆ct+1) is constant for simplicity. When
the economy is in a bad state (low xt), λ(xt) is high, households are more sensitive
to risk, and hence a given conditional variance leads to a lower interest rate. This is
because the presence of habits makes households dislike negative shocks more when
they are in a bad state. Hence, even though they are aware of the mean-reverting
process driving the economy on average, they are concerned about the fact that bad
shocks happen also in bad times. As a result, they are tempted to save and alleviate
the effects of potential future bad shocks even when the economy is in a bad state,
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putting downward pressure on the interest rate.74
The two intertemporal smoothing terms contribute to make interest rates counter-
cyclical (cov(rrt, xt) < 0), whereas the precautionary saving term contributes to make
them procyclical. Verdelhan shows that in the context of his endowment economy
model, procyclical interest rates are sufficient to obtain a negative UIP coefficient.
By assuming a random-walk process for consumption, Verdelhan is in effect muting
most of the intertemporal smoothing motive, since Et(∆ct+1) = 0.75 Given a constant
vart(∆ct+1) = σ
2
c , the simple parameter condition −σ(1 − ν) + σ
2σ2c
X
2 > 0 is sufficient
to obtain procyclical interest rates and a negative UIP coefficient. This condition can
be achieved by assuming a parameter ν very close to one (if the surplus consumption
ratio is very persistent, it is less mean reverting, dampening further intertemporal
smoothing motives) and high risk aversion or variance of consumption growth.
In a model with mean-reversion in the real variables, obtaining procyclical interest
rates is a lot more challenging. There is no simple parameter condition that ensures
the procyclicality. To uncover the relative strength of the intertemporal smoothing
and precautionary saving motives, the model must be simulated.76
Asset pricing in a production economy with external habits Chen (2017)
investigates whether empirical asset-pricing moments such as the mean and variance
74In a model with external habits and endogenous production, Chen (2017) obtains a volatility of
consumption that is higher in bad times. Because of precautionary saving behavior, consumption
is more affected by shocks when the economy is in a bad state. In the model discussed here,
households cannot save across periods, but they can smooth the effect of shocks by trading with the
other country. The time-varying behavior of consumption growth must be examined from model
simulations. Preliminary results suggest no such significant systematic behavior.
75Verdelhan in fact assumes a process of random walk with a drift for consumption, so that
Et(∆ct+1) is equal to a constant, which then enters the constant term in the equation for the
interest rate.
76Making the sensitivity function λ(xt) even more strongly decreasing in xt does not help making
interest rates procyclical. While it strengthens the precautionary saving motive of household, it also
strengthens their intertemporal smoothing motive.
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of the equity premium can be predicted by a general-equilbrium model featuring the
type of external habits introduced by Campbell & Cochrane (1999). Chen’s model
includes production with capital and quadratic capital adjustment costs. His results
show that the model can generate strong precautionary saving motives even when
λ(xt) is assumed to be a constant. This comes from the conditional variance of con-
sumption growth vart(∆ct+1) being countercyclical. In bad times, the precautionary
saving motive is stronger, reducing the intertemporal smoothing of consumption. This
makes consumption more volatile in bad times and therefore increases the conditional
variance of consumption growth. This mechanism relies on households being able to
save across periods, which is achieved from the presence of endogenous physical capi-
tal in the economy. As predicted by Campbell and Cochrane, the empirically relevant
asset pricing properties of their model remain when endogenous production is added,
as long as agents are able to save across time periods.
Solving the model The model must be approximated to at least a third order in
order to capture time-varying risk premia and potential UIP properties. The model is
solved and simulated using Dynare and the pruning algorithm provided by Andreasen
et al. (2017).
3.3.4 Habit model simulation results and discussion
As a first step, I reproduce the results in Verdelhan (2010) by calibrating the
model to obtain a process for (log of) consumption that is completely exogenous and
(almost) a random walk. This involves making the following changes: 1- prevent trade
in goods across countries by making households extremely home-biased (γ = 0.99999);
2- fix labor supply to its steady state value (Nt = N¯ , N∗t = N¯∗); 3- make prices com-
pletely flexible (α = 0); and 4- make the process for (log of) technology (almost) a
random walk (ρA = 0.99999). The first change insures that each country consumes
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exactly what it produces. The second change insures that the output of each in-
termediate good producer varies only with demand (from final good producers) and
technology. The third change insures that all intermediate good producers are iden-
tical. This is required to get aggregate production to follow the technology process
(otherwise, labor can be reallocated across intermediate good producers even when
aggregate labor remains fixed). It also eliminates the real effects of monetary shocks.
The fourth change insures that technology, output, and consumption follow a random
walk process. The remaining parameters are set as in the baseline model described in
Section 3.2. The two additional parameters, the persistence of the surplus consump-
tion ratio process, ν, and the steady-state value of the surplus consumption ratio, X,
are calibrated to 0.99 and 0.07, respectively, following Verdelhan (2010).
Key simulated moments are presented on the first line of Table 3.3.77 The surplus
consumption ratio is positively correlated with the real interest rate and the UIP coef-
ficient is negative.78 This confirms the results obtained by Verdelhan (2010): as long
as σ(ν− 1) + σ2σ2A
X
2 > 0, the precautionary saving motive dominates the intertemporal
smoothing motive, and the model predicts a negative UIP coefficient.
In a second step, I relax one at the time the four changes described above in or-
der to see which assumptions are necessary to obtain a UIP coefficient that is smaller
than one. Simulated moments are presented on lines 2-5 of Table 3.3. The first result
to note is that the random-walk process of technology (and hence of consumption)
and fully flexible prices are necessary to obtain a negative UIP coefficient (see lines
77Because agents’ responses to shocks depend on the current state of the economy, impulse re-
sponses are not a useful tool to analyze the predictions of this model.
78In Verdelhan’s model, the consumption level can be eliminated completely from the expression
for the interest rate, so that the cyclicality of interest rates is determined based on the surplus
consumption ratio. In the general-equilibrium version of the model, the consumption level and the
surplus consumption ratio both appear in the expression. The cyclicality of interest rates is therefore
not as clearly defined and both the correlation of interest rates with the surplus consumption ratio
and with the consumption level matter for the UIP coefficient.
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2 and 3 of Table 3.3). When the consumption process is a random walk, the ex-
pected change in consumption is not affected by a given shock realization. Hence,
the intertemporal smoothing behavior is weak. The precautionary saving motive is
however affected. A good shock makes the household less risk averse by increasing the
surplus consumption ratio. As described above, this decreases the incentives to save
and increases the interest rate. When the process is mean-reverting, the expected
change in consumption is time-varying, and the intertemporal smoothing motive is
stronger. Interest rates become countercyclical, and the UIP coefficient is positive.
The same logic applies to the price stickiness assumption. When prices are fully
flexible, the economy adjusts to shocks instantaneously.79 When prices are sticky, real
variables such as consumption adjust slowly.80 Hence, any shock to the technology
process affects not only current consumption but also the expected change in con-
sumption, thereby strengthening intertemporal smoothing and making interest rate
countercyclical.
When countries are allowed to trade (the home-bias parameter γ is reduced to
0.85; line 4 of Table 3.3), the resulting UIP coefficient is again negative. Opening trade
has two main effects: households can reduce their exposure to their own countries’
technological shocks by consuming the other country’s goods, but this also makes
them more exposed to technological shocks in the other country. Overall, however,
the consumption process remains a random walk, so that intertemporal smoothing is
still weak.81
79For this simulation, monetary shocks have been turned off (σ2R = 0) to show the effect of price
stickiness only.
80Under rational expectations, households are aware that prices take time to adjust.
81The magnitudes of the regression coefficients obtained with different calibrations should not be
compared since the changes in assumptions cause important changes in the variance of the variables.
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When households are able to vary their supply of labor, the level of production
(and consumption) is less directly connected to the level of technology. However,
the economy still adjusts to shocks instantaneously. Hence, as long as technology
follows a random walk process, so does consumption. What differs from Verdelhan’s
model is the magnitude of the response of consumption to a technology shock. If, as
in the benchmark calibration, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is such that the
wealth effect dominates the substitution effect, households work less in response to a
good shock. Hence the response of production is dampened, lowering the volatility
of consumption and weakening precautionary saving. Recall the condition required
to obtain a negative UIP coefficient: −σ(1 − ν) + σ2σ2c
X
2 > 0. When labor is fixed,
σ2c = σ
2
A. When labor is flexible and the wealth effect dominates, σ2c < σ2A. Hence
the volatility of technology shocks must be increased to be able to obtain a negative
UIP coefficient. For example, if home bias is (almost) complete, prices are flexible,
technology is (almost) a random walk and the rest of the parameters are calibrated
as in the benchmark case (including φ = 1.5), obtaining σ(ν − 1) + σ2σ2c
X
2 > 0 requires
σA > 0.0592 since simulations produce a ratio σcσA ≈ 0.0836.
Unsurprisingly, when the model is calibrated similarly to the baseline model, with
auto-regressive technology, sticky prices, international trade, and flexible labor, it is
unable to produce a negative UIP coefficient (line 6 of Table 3.3). Table 3.4 con-
tains more simulated moments for the model with external habits under Verdelhan’s
(column 3) and the benchmark (column 4) calibration. Results show that Verdel-
han’s calibration does improve the UIP prediction, but does worse than the baseline
model in matching other macroeconomic moments, especially the auto-correlation of
real variables (due to the presence of the random walk) and the volatility of the real
exchange rate. The habit model calibrated under the benchmark calibration, on the
other hand, does not improve on the baseline model’s UIP predictions but does im-
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prove other moments, especially those related to the volatility and auto-correlation
of interest rates. It however does worse on the correlation across countries of GDP
and consumption, worsening the international consumption correlation puzzle.
3.4 Model with Distorted Beliefs
In this section I first summarize the model with distorted beliefs introduced by
Gourinchas & Tornell (2004) and describe how it solves the UIP puzzle. I then insert
the distorted beliefs into the baseline model introduced in Section 3.2. I discuss the
conditions required for this version of the model to solve the UIP puzzle.
3.4.1 The distorted beliefs model of Gourinchas & Tornell (2004)
Gourinchas & Tornell (2004) suggest a solution to the UIP puzzle, and to other
exchange rate puzzles, using biased expectations. In their model, agents misinterpret
shocks to the interest rate differentials between the two countries: they believe that
the shocks are more transitory (i.e., less persistent) than they actually are. They do
not learn about their bias, so that it persists over time. Note that the agents always
perfectly observe the interest rate differential. What is biased is what they expect the
differential to be in the future. Hence, this model yields expectation errors that are
not zero on average.
Since the agents underestimate the persistence of interest rate shocks, the re-
sponse of the exchange rate to these shocks is smaller than under rational expecta-
tions. As future periods unfold and agents realize their mistake, the exchange rate’s
behavior reflects this learning and moves towards the path it would have taken if
agents had had correct expectations.
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In the authors’ setting, the interest rate differential between the two countries fol-
lows a first-order autoregressive process and is directly subject to shocks. The agents
believe that for any observed shock, there is a non-zero probability that the shock
is transitory. However, in reality, all shocks are persistent and the probability of a
shock being transitory is zero. Expectations are formed by agents using the Kalman
filter. Their expectations of the future interest rate differential is a weighted average
of their previous expectation of the differential, and the actual current differential.
If agents expect the interest rate differential to go back towards steady state faster
than it actually does, the exchange rate reacts less on impact of a given shock.
Following a (true) positive shock to the interest rate differential rt − r∗t , there
are two different effects that drive the exchange rate. The usual effect is that fol-
lowing a relative increase in the Home interest rate that is expected to be persistent,
the no-arbitrage condition requires the Home currency to be expected to depreciate:
since markets are complete, there should not be any expected profit from investing in
Home rather than in Foreign. Therefore, on impact of the shock, the exchange rate
decreases (the Home currency appreciates), and then increases back towards steady
state as the (true, persistent) shock goes away. This is the “rational” behavior of the
exchange rate and it predicts a UIP coefficient equal to exactly one.
The second effect is the “irrational” behavior of the exchange rate: since agents
do not believe that the high interest rate differential will last, they do not believe
that the profit opportunity will last either. Therefore, the subjective no-arbitrage
condition requires the exchange rate to decrease less than in the rational case. In
the next period, the agents observe that the interest rate differential is much greater
than they expected. Therefore, the exchange rate does not increase back towards
steady state as fast as agents expected. Under some parameterizations, the exchange
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rate can continue to decrease, so that we can have a country with a high interest
rate, whose currency is appreciating. Gourinchas and Tornell show that this can lead
to a negative UIP coefficient. Under any parameterization, as long as agents give a
non-zero probability to the shock being transitory, the UIP coefficient is smaller than
one due to the initial response of the exchange rate being too small.
3.4.2 The DSGE model with distorted beliefs
This version of the model combines the DSGE baseline model described in Sec-
tion 3.2 with the distorted beliefs and learning behavior described in Gourinchas &
Tornell (2004). The model of Gourinchas & Tornell (2004) is in reduced form, and the
shock about which agents are progressively learning hits the interest-rate differential
directly. I adapt this feature by making beliefs about the shocks to monetary policy
rules distorted, so that in my model, there are two elements about which agents are
uncertain, one in each country.
The consumption and production sides of the model are identical to the base-
line model. However, since expectations are biased due to the distorted beliefs, the
forward-looking behavior of consumers and firms are impacted. The symbol Est de-
notes the subjective, or biased, expectations of agents whereas Et continues to denote
rational, unbiased, expectations.
Monetary policy The monetary policy rules are still given by
(1 +Rt) = (1 +Rt−1)φi
(
1
β
)1−φi ( Pt
Pt−1
)(1−φi)φpi
MSt (3.93)
(1 +R∗t ) = (1 +R
∗
t−1)
φi
(
1
β
)1−φi ( P ∗t
P ∗t−1
)(1−φi)φpi
MS∗t (3.94)
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where
logMSt = ρR logMSt−1 + εR,t (3.95)
logMS∗t = ρR logMS
∗
t−1 + ε
∗
R,t (3.96)
and where εR,t, ε∗R,t ∼ iidN(0, σ2R).
However, agents have beliefs about the monetary policy shocks that differ from
the reality. While all monetary policy shocks MSt and MS∗t are persistent, agents
believe that some shocks are transitory. Their beliefs about logMSt and logMS∗t are
represented by
logMSt = zt + υt, zt = ρRzt−1 + εR,t, υt = ευ,t (3.97)
logMS∗t = z
∗
t + υ
∗
t , z
∗
t = ρRz
∗
t−1 + ε
∗
R,t, υ
∗
t = ε
∗
υ,t (3.98)
where ευ,t, ε∗υ,t ∼ iidN(0, σs2υ ). Therefore, according to the agents’ beliefs, a given
change in MSt could be caused either by a transitory innovation ευ,t or by a per-
sistent innovation εR,t. The monetary shocks MSt and MS∗t are perfectly observed
by all agents, but zt, z∗t , υt, υ∗t , εR,t, and ε∗R,t are unobservable. In reality, the true
σ2υ = 0.82
Learning Agents learn about the true nature of the shocks using the Kalman filter.
Each period, they extract information from the realization of the monetary shocks
MSt and MS∗t . They form their expectations about the future realizations of MSt+1
82Moran & Nono (2018) also insert incomplete information about monetary policy into a two-
country DSGE model and examine the implications for the UIP puzzle. Their monetary policy rule
however involves a time-varying inflation target. Agents cannot immediately distinguish between
transitory policy shocks and persistent shocks to the inflation target.
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and MS∗t+1 by giving a weight to the current realizations and a weight to what they
previously expected the current realizations to be. Agents’ beliefs therefore evolve
according to
Est logMSt+1 = (1− κ)ρREst−1 logMSt + κρR logMSt (3.99)
Est logMS
∗
t+1 = (1− κ)ρREst−1 logMS∗t + κρR logMS∗t (3.100)
where κ is the learning parameter given by
κ =
1 + ∆− ηs(1− ρ2R)
1 + ∆ + ηs(1− ρ2R)
where ∆ = [ηs(1− ρ2R) + 1]2 + 4ηsρ2R and where ηs = σ
s2
υ
σ2R
. The learning parameter κ
is derived from the Kalman filter.83 It is easy to see that κ is decreasing in ηs and
increasing in ρR: when beliefs are more distorted, agents put less weight on their cur-
rent observation, and when the true shock is more persistent, agents put more weight
on their current observation since the current observation contains more information
about the future observation.
Under rational expectations, agents would instead expect
Et logMSt+1 = ρR logMSt
Et logMS
∗
t+1 = ρR logMS
∗
t .
The distorted beliefs imply that if agents give positive probability to the realization of
transitory monetary shocks, then Est logMSt+1 < Et logMSt+1 since κ < 1. Agents
expect the disturbance to be less persistent than it actually is.
83Details about the Kalman filter are included below.
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Equilibrium An equilibrium for this version of the model is defined as an allocation
for the variables Nt, N∗t , Ct, C∗t , Wt, W ∗t , Pt, P ∗t , Rt, R∗t , CH,t, C∗H,t, CF,t, C∗F,t,
PH,t, P ∗F,t, Yt, Y ∗t , Vt, V ∗t , piH,t, pi∗F,t, MCt, MC∗t , NNt, NN∗t , DDt, DD∗t , Qt,t+1,
Q∗t,t+1, TOTt, and St that satisfies the equations (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.20), (3.21),
(3.22),(3.24), (3.25), (3.26), (3.27), (3.28), (3.29), (3.32), (3.33), (3.42), (3.46), (3.47),
(3.48), (3.49), (3.51), (3.54), (3.55), (3.56), (3.57), (3.58), (3.59), (3.60), (3.61), (3.64),
(3.66), (3.68), and (3.69), given the exogenous processes for At, A∗t , MSt, and MS∗t
given by (3.70), (3.71), (3.72), (3.73), (3.74), and (3.75) and given that agents believe
that the monetary shocks processes are given by (3.97) and (3.98).
UIP implications In Gourinchas & Tornell (2004), the interest rate differential
between the two countries is exogenous, so that the UIP predictions of their model
can be analyzed directly. The authors are able to derive the asymptotic value of
the UIP coefficient. In this general-equilibrium version of the model, such a simple
condition cannot be derived and the UIP coefficient has to be estimated using model
simulations. However, it is still possible to show how and why the UIP coefficient is
expected to be different from one.
Recall that in the baseline model, a positive (contractionary) monetary shock
in Home makes the Home interest rate increase more than the Foreign rate. In the
same time, since this is a bad shock for Home, the Home currency appreciates (the
exchange rate decreases), in accordance with the risk sharing condition.
When beliefs are distorted, agents expect the monetary shock to be less persis-
tent than it actually is. Hence, the interest rate differential is smaller and the Home
currency appreciates less. In the next period, as agents observe that the Home mone-
tary shock MSt is higher than expected, they start realizing their error and, if beliefs
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are distorted enough, the Home currency keeps appreciating. It is therefore possible
to observe a relatively high Home real interest rate coexisting with a Home currency
that is appreciating.
Solving the model The model with distorted beliefs is log-linearized since the
mechanism introduced to solve the UIP puzzle, biased expectations, affects the vari-
ables at the first order.
In order to predict accurately the agents’ behavior, their beliefs must be used to
solve the model. That is, the model that is solved is the model as it exists in the agents’
mind, where logMSt and logMS∗t are replaced with zt + vt and z∗t + v∗t , respectively.
This version is log-linearized and solved using Dynare. Let Yt be a vector containing
all control variables, Xt be a vector containing all state variables and εt be a vector
containing all real and imagined shocks, so that εt = [εA,t, ε∗A,t, εR,t, ε∗R,t, ευ,t, ε∗υ,t]′.
Dynare solves the model and provides the matrices A, B, C, and D in the system:
Yt = AXt−1 +Bεt
Xt = CXt−1 +Dεt (3.101)
Note that Xt contains elements that are not observed, zt and z∗t , and that εt also
contains elements that are not observed. Because the model is approximated to the
first order, certainty equivalence applies: the agents do not take into account that
their beliefs may not be true, even if they know that their beliefs are biased. When
forming their beliefs about shocks, agents are aware of their bias, as can be seen from
the definition of the learning parameter κ. However, in response to these shocks, they
behave according to their expectations only, and are not affected by the degree of bias.
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The model is simulated using the agents’ beliefs rather than the actual value of
the variables. The values of the unobserved variables and shocks are replaced by the
values the agents believe they have. The model is simulated as follows:
Yt = AXt−1|t +Bεt|t
Xt = CXt−1|t +Dεt|t. (3.102)
By certainty equivalence, the matrices A, B, C, and D are identical in the systems
(3.101) and (3.102). The “believed” values of the Home variables and shocks are ob-
tained from a simple version of the Kalman filter and smoother containing only three
variables: MSt, zt, and υt. Since MSt is perfectly observed and completely absorbs
the behavior of the two believed shocks zt and vt, agents learn about zt and vt by ob-
serving onlyMSt. They do not get any additional information about these two shocks
than the information contained in MSt. This allows me to apply the Kalman filter
to these three variables only and obtain the series {zt|t}Tt=0 and {vt|t}Tt=0 = {ευ,t|t}Tt=0.
The agents learn about Foreign monetary shocks in an identical way, using a Kalman
filter containing only MS∗t , z∗t and v∗t . Agents do not have more information about
their own country’s monetary shocks than about the other country’s.
The values of zt−1|t and εR,t|t are then obtained using the Kalman smoother. Since
zt = ρRzt−1 + εR,t, consistency of beliefs implies
zt|t = ρRzt−1|t + εR,t|t.
The Kalman smoother yields the series {zt−1|t}Tt=0. The series {εR,t|t}Tt=0 is obtained
from the residual.
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The Kalman filter equations are (following the notation in Hamilton (1994)):
Pt|t−1 = FPt−1|t−1F ′ +Q
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1HΩ−1t|t−1H ′Pt|t−1
xt|t−1 = Fxt−1|t−1
xt|t = xt|t−1 + Pt|t−1HΩ−1t|t−1(Xt −Xt|t−1)
Xt|t−1 = H ′xt|t−1
Ωt|t−1 = H ′Pt|t−1H
whereXt = MSt, xt =
 zt
vt
, H ′ = [ 1 1 ], F =
 ρR 0
0 0
, Q =
 σ2R 0
0 σs2υ
,
P1|0 is such that P1|0 = FP1|0F ′ +Q, and x1|0 = 0.
The Kalman smoother equation is
xt−1|t = xt−1|t−1 + Pt−1|t−1F ′P−1t|t−1(xt|t − xt|t−1).
Following Gourinchas & Tornell (2004), I assume that the learning process has
been going for long enough that the values of Pt|t and Pt|t−1 have converged. This
yields the learning parameter κ introduced earlier.
3.4.3 Distorted beliefs model simulation results and discussion
The benchmark calibration of this model is the exact same as the calibration de-
scribed in Section 3.2.7. The only additional parameter is σs2v , the standard deviation
of the (completely) transitory shock to which agents wrongly believe monetary policy
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could be subject. To obtain the results presented and analyzed below, I use several
values for σ2sv and discuss how this parameter impacts the model’s UIP predictions.84
The benchmark value is to set σ2sv = σR so that both types of monetary shocks are
drawn from the same distribution.
Figure 3.3 contains the impulse responses of selected variables to a contractionary
monetary shock in Home.85,86 It shows that under the benchmark calibration, real
variables respond to the monetary shock almost exactly as in the baseline model. The
response of nominal variables differs slightly, but patterns are identical. Column 3
of Table 3.5 contains the simulation results for this benchmark calibration. The UIP
coefficients are below but close to one. This is not very surprising. What distinguishes
the two types of monetary shocks is that one is persistent and the other one is com-
pletely transitory. However, under the benchmark calibration, the persistent shock is
not very persistent: the autocorrelation, ρR, is only 0.12. Since both shocks resemble
each other, the fact that agents take time to learn which type of shock is actually
happening does not change their behavior a lot: they react similarly regardless of the
type of the shock. Therefore, this version of the model resembles the baseline model
and UIP coefficients are close to one.
Under these circumstances, modifying only the size of the transitory shock, σsv,
does not impact significantly the UIP predictions of the model. Increasing the persis-
tence of the (true) persistent shock, however, has major impacts on the results. When
ρR = 0.7 and σsv = σR, the real UIP coefficient is down to 0.50, which is significantly
below one. Increasing the size of the transitory shock to σsv = 7σR reduces it further
84Gourinchas & Tornell (2004) do not suggest a reasonable value for this parameter.
85Impulse responses for the technology shocks are not presented for this version of the model since
there is perfect information about this type of shocks and agents react in the exact same way as
they do in the baseline model.
86Results in this section, especially for nominal variables, are preliminary.
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to 0.24. When the persistent shock is made more persistent, the agents’ response to
it is more different from their response to the transitory shock. When the transitory
shock is larger than the persistent shock, agents learn more slowly about the type
of shock that occurred. It is harder for them to learn whether a persistent shock or
repeated transitory shocks have occurred. Hence, the larger σsv, the more “plausible”
it is for them that another transitory shock has happened and the more slowly they
learn the true nature of the shock.87
The simulation results and impulse responses obtained with ρR = 0.7 and σsυ =
7σR are presented Column 5 of Table 3.5 and in Figure 3.4, respectively, and show
the learning process of agents. On impact of the shock, the nominal interest rate in
the Home country increases more than under perfect information.88 Since households
perceive the shock to be less contractionary (because less persistent) than it actually
is, consumption in Home decreases less and prices also decrease less. Hence, the mon-
etary authority has less incentive to decrease the policy rate. In the same time, since
the shock is first perceived to be less contractionary than it actually is, risk sharing
implies that the Home currency does not appreciate as much as in the baseline model
(RERt decreases less). In the following period, agents learn that the shock is more
persistent than expected, so that the Home currency continues to appreciate. Hence,
on impact, the Home interest rate is higher than the Foreign interest rate, yet the
Home currency will still appreciate in the next period. This is sufficient to make the
real UIP coefficient significantly below one, at 0.24.
The nominal UIP coefficient, at -1.65, is very negative under this calibration.
Because agents underestimate the persistence of the monetary shocks, prices do not
87This is true to some extent. For very large values of σsυ,t, agents are quickly able to learn the
true nature of a shock looking only at its size.
88The nominal interest rate actually decreases under perfect information, that is, the action of the
monetary authority fully overturns the initial shock.
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respond as much and the Home nominal interest rate’s response is positive, even
though it is negative under perfect information. As a result, the interest rate differ-
ential is positive and remains so for several periods, while the Home nominal exchange
rate appreciates on impact and keeps appreciating to a new steady state.
Despite modifying significantly the behavior of variables in response to monetary
shocks, the inclusion of distorted beliefs generates moments that are very similar to
those generated by the baseline model. It even replicates better the high autocorre-
lation of interest rates.
3.5 Conclusion
Several mechanisms have been suggested by the existing literature to explain the
UIP puzzle. To simplify the analysis, they are typically set in endowment-economy
settings. In this chapter, I investigate how these mechanisms perform when intro-
duced into an otherwise standard two-country DSGE model.
The first mechanism relies on a time-varying risk premium and has been sug-
gested by Verdelhan (2010). The presence of external habits in households’ prefer-
ences makes them more risk averse, and hence more prone to saving, in bad times.
Verdelhan shows that when consumption is assumed to follow a random-walk process,
this is sufficient to obtain procyclical interest rates and a negative UIP coefficient. I
show that when consumption does not follow a random-walk process, that is, when
expected consumption growth is time-varying, households’ consumption smoothing is
stronger. The effect of time-varying risk aversion on interest rates is dampened and
the UIP coefficient is positive and close to one.
The second mechanism relies on biased expectations and has been suggested by
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Gourinchas & Tornell (2004). Because agents systematically underestimate the per-
sistence of monetary shocks, they under-react to such shocks. As a result, it is possible
to obtain a high-interest rate currency that appreciates for several periods as agents
learn the true nature of the shock. I show that in a DSGE framework, the mechanism
is intact, but dampened. As a result, (true) monetary shocks must be assumed to be
very persistent. Furthermore, agents’ expectations must be assumed to be strongly
biased to have sizable effects.
Hence in this chapter I demonstrate that models that can explain the UIP puzzle
in endowment-economy frameworks do not perform as well when re-cast in a standard
DSGE framework. The forces that bring the UIP coefficient towards unity in DSGE
models are difficult to counteract. My results however show that the two types
of models, those relying on time-varying risk premia and those relying on biased
expectations, are differently affected by the change in framework. For the latter
type, the mechanism is weakened, but not completely overturned. Further research
is needed to explore how these two types of models would perform in the presence of
endogenous physical capital.
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1: Baseline model, technology shock in Home
Figure 3.2: Baseline model, monetary shock in Home
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Figure 3.3: Contractionary monetary shock in Home, distorted beliefs model, bench-
mark calibration
Figure 3.4: Contractionary monetary shock in Home, distorted beliefs model, alter-
native calibration
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3.7 Tables
Param. Description Value Explanation
α Degree of price stickiness 0.75 Prices hold on average for
4 quarters
β Households’ discount factor 0.99 Annualized risk-free interest
rate of 4 %
ξ Elasticity of substitution in production 7.66 Mark-up of 15%
between the intermediate goods
produced within a country
θ Elasticity of substitution in 1.5 Standard
consumption between the Home and
Foreign goods
γ Degree of home bias 0.85 Import-to-consumption
ratio of 0.15
φ Inverse of Frisch labor supply 1.5 Standard
elasticity
σ Degree of risk aversion 2 Standard
φi Degree of interest-rate smoothing 0.8 Smets & Wouters (2007)
φpi Degree of inflation targeting 2 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρA Persistence of technology shock 0.95 Smets & Wouters (2007)
ρR Persistence of monetary shock 0.12 Smets & Wouters (2007)
σA Standard deviation of technology 0.0075 σA/σR from
shock Smets & Wouters (2007)
σR Standard deviation of monetary 0.0040 Eichenbaum & Evans (1995)
shock
Table 3.1: Benchmark calibration
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Moment Data Baseline Baseline
1st-order 3rd-order
βUIP,nom -0.23 1.00 0.99
βUIP,real -0.01 1.00 1.00
σ(Ct)/σ(Yt) 0.87 0.63 0.64
σ(Nt)/σ(Yt) 1.24 0.69 0.50
σ(Rt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.20 0.15
σ(RealRt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.34 0.22
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) 0.77 0.80 0.90
ρ(Ct, Ct−1) 0.89 0.81 0.91
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.84 0.68 0.76
ρ(RealRt, RealRt−1) 0.75 0.60 0.61
ρ(Yt, Y
∗
t ) 0.55 -0.33 -0.33
ρ(Ct, C
∗
t ) 0.36 0.58 0.61
σ(∆St) 0.04 0.04 0.02
σ(∆RERt) 0.04 0.02 0.01
ρ(∆St,∆St−1) 0.09 -0.08 -0.07
ρ(∆RERt,∆RERt−1) 0.06 -0.18 -0.12
Table 3.2: Simulated moments, baseline model
Calibration Simulated moments
γ Aggr. labor α ρA ρ(rrt, ct) ρ(rrt, xt) βUIP
1 0.99999 fixed 0 0.99999 0.22 0.30 -0.16
2 0.99999 fixed 0 0.95 -0.44 -0.61 1.24
3 0.99999 fixed 0.75 0.99999 -0.25 -0.74 1.00
4 0.85 fixed 0 0.99999 0.10 -0.05 -1.45
5 0.99999 flexible 0 0.99999 -0.12 -0.98 1.49
6 0.85 flexible 0.75 0.95 -0.40 -0.54 1.00
Table 3.3: Selected simulated moments under different calibrations, habit model
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Moment Data Baseline Habit Habit
3rd-order Verdelhan Benchmark
βUIP,nom -0.23 0.99 - 0.99
βUIP,real -0.01 1.00 -0.17 1.00
σ(Ct)/σ(Yt) 0.87 0.64 1.00 0.14
σ(Nt)/σ(Yt) 1.24 0.50 - 1.09
σ(Rt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.15 - 0.27
σ(RealRt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.34 0.10 0.33
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) 0.77 0.90 1.00 0.91
ρ(Ct, Ct−1) 0.89 0.91 1.00 0.97
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.84 0.76 - 0.83
ρ(RealRt, RealRt−1) 0.75 0.60 0.99 0.67
ρ(Yt, Y
∗
t ) 0.55 -0.33 0.07 -0.97
ρ(Ct, C
∗
t ) 0.36 0.61 0.07 0.74
σ(∆St) 0.04 0.02 - 0.02
σ(∆RERt) 0.04 0.01 0.32 0.01
ρ(∆St,∆St−1) 0.09 -0.07 - -0.07
ρ(∆RERt,∆RERt−1) 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 -0.10
ρ(RealRt, Xt) - - 0.31 -0.53
Table 3.4: Simulated moments, habit model
Moment Data Baseline Beliefs Beliefs
1st-order Benchmark ρR = 0.7
calibration σsυ = 7σR
βUIP,nom -0.23 1.00 0.84 -1.65
βUIP,real -0.01 1.00 0.92 0.24
σ(Ct)/σ(Yt) 0.87 0.63 0.65 0.63
σ(Nt)/σ(Yt) 1.24 0.69 0.37 0.68
σ(Rt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.20 0.12 0.21
σ(RealRt)/σ(Yt) 0.79 0.34 0.14 0.35
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) 0.77 0.80 0.95 0.94
ρ(Ct, Ct−1) 0.89 0.81 0.95 0.94
ρ(Rt, Rt−1) 0.84 0.68 0.83 0.90
ρ(RealRt, RealRt−1) 0.75 0.60 0.64 0.90
ρ(Yt, Y
∗
t ) 0.55 -0.33 -0.32 -0.38
ρ(Ct, C
∗
t ) 0.36 0.58 0.62 0.58
σ(∆St) 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02
σ(∆RERt) 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
ρ(∆St,∆St−1) 0.09 -0.08 -0.01 0.56
ρ(∆RERt,∆RERt−1) 0.06 -0.18 0.01 0.30
Table 3.5: Simulated moments, distorted beliefs model
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